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We derive testable implications of model in which first best allocations are not achieved because
of a moral hazard problem with hidden saving. We show that in this environment agents typically
achieve more insurance than that obtained under autarchy via saving, and that consumption allocation
gives rise to 'excess smoothness of consumption', as found and defined by Campbell and Deaton (1987).
We argue that the evidence on excess smoothness is consistent with a violation of the simple intertemporal
budget constraint considered in a Bewley economy (with a single asset) and use techniques proposed
by Hansen et al. (1991) to test the intertemporal budget constraint. We also construct closed form examples
where the excess smoothness parameter has a structural interpretation in terms of the severity of the
moral hazard problem. Evidence from the UK on the dynamic properties of consumption and income
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This paper characterizes the relationship between consumption and income variability in a class
of private information models with asset accumulation and uses this characterization to derive
some of their empirical implications. Interest in these models is partly motivated by the empirical
rejection of simpler approaches, including the hypothesis of complete insurance markets and models
where the only insurance available to agents is self insurance, such as simple versions of the life
cycle/ permanent income hypothesis. Our approach enables us to interpret some of the results in
the literature (and those we present below) as providing evidence on the market structure facing
economic agents. Interestingly, we are able to do so without having to specify the information set
available to economic agents.
The complete insurance hypothesis is soundly rejected by the data (e.g. Attanasio and Davis,
1996). A commonly used alternative is to assume that markets are exogenously incomplete. For
example, the Bewley model embeds a version of the permanent income model in a market structure
where the only mechanism available to agents to smooth consumption is through personal savings
(and borrowing), possibly with a single asset. Intertemporal trades can be further limited by the
impossibility of borrowing beyond a certain level, possibly zero.1 In between the two extremes of
complete markets and very limited and exogenously given intertemporal trade opportunities there
are other possibilities were individuals have access to some state contingent mechanisms that provide
insurance over and above the ‘self insurance’ considered in the Bewley model. These intermediate
cases include models where the intertemporal markets available to agents are exogenously given
and models were the market structure arises endogenously from speci￿c imperfections, such as the
lack of contracts enforceability or private information. The model we propose belongs to this latter
set. In particular, we focus on settings with private information problems.
In a life-cycle model (or in a Permanent Income model with in￿nite horizon), consumption
levels are pinned down by two sets of equations. A set of intertemporal Euler equations, which
relate expected changes in consumption over time to intertemporal prices, and an intertemporal
budget constraint. The former equations are valid under a variety of circumstances: in particular,
one does not need to specify the complete set of assets (contingent and not) that are available to a
consumer. As long as one considers an asset for which the consumer is not at a corner, then there
is an Euler equation holding for that particular asset, regardless of what the consumer is doing in
other markets. Moreover, the orthogonality restrictions implied by an Euler equation would also
1Whether these constraints are ever binding depends on the properties of the income process and, in particular,
on its support.
2hold if one were to mis-specify the information set available to agents. As long as the agents know
more than the econometrician, by the law of iterated expectations, the Euler equation hold even
with coarser information sets.
The robustness of the Euler equation is a big advantage from an empirical point of view. Starting
with Hall (1978), many authors have focused on the orthogonality restrictions implied by the Euler
equation for consumption that can be derived from a consumer maximization problem. With
this approach one can be agnostic about many aspects of the environment in which the consumer
operates and even on the information set available to agents. While the level of consumption might
depend in an unknown way on expectations of future income and other unobservable quantities,
the Euler equation does not need a closed form solution for consumption and exploits the fact that
changes in marginal utility and, under some functional form assumptions, (log) consumption, should
be unpredictable and, in particular, should not be related to predictable changes in income. Many
authors reported violations of the orthogonality restrictions that take the form of ‘excess sensitivity’
of consumption growth to expected changes in income and interpreted this as evidence of restrictions
to intertemporal trades or liquidity constraints. Other authors (see Attanasio 2000 for a survey
and a discussion), instead, have argued that the so-called excess sensitivity of consumption is not
necessary due to binding liquidity constraints and can be for explained away by non-separability
between leisure and consumption, demographic e￿ects and aggregation problems.
A di￿erent approach to the empirical implications of the life cycle model is to focus on the
level of consumption and on its relationship with income. Flavin (1981), for instance, explored
the cross equation restrictions imposed on the VAR representation of consumption and income
by the PIH. Campbell (1987), in a related contribution, shows that savings should be predicting
subsequent declines in labour income. To derive these restrictions one uses both the Euler equation
and the intertemporal budget constraint. Campbell and Deaton (1989), using a similar approach,
pointed out that consumption seems to be ‘excessively smooth’ to be consistent with the PIH: that
is consumption does not seem to react ‘enough’ to permanent innovation to income. If one assumes
that consumers have only access to an asset with a speci￿ed interest rate to borrow and save, then,
Campbell and Deaton (1989), show how excess sensitivity and excess smoothness can be related
and, conditional on the intertemporal budget constraint holding, are essentially equivalent.
However, we can have situations where the Euler equation for a given asset is not violated and
yet, an intertemporal budget constraint where that asset is the only one available to the agent is
violated as one neglects all the other (possibly state contingent) assets available to the consumer.
And this violation of the IBC can be such as to imply ‘excess smoothness’ of consumption.
3In this paper, we show how a model where risk is shared imperfectly because of moral hazard
can generate ‘excess smoothness’ in the absence of ‘excess sensitivity’. In particular, consumption
will not exhibit excess sensitivity but, because of the additional insurance provided to consumers
relative to a Bewley economy, gives rise to ’excess smoothness’ in the sense of Campbell and Deaton.
We can therefore distinguish sharply between ‘excess sensitivity’ and ‘excess smoothness’.
We start by developing a common theoretical framework that allow us to compare two dy-
namic asymmetric information models with asset accumulation that virtually exhaust the existing
literature on dynamic contracting: the hidden income (adverse selection) model and the action
moral hazard framework. Moreover, we crucially assume that agents have secret (or non con-
tractible) access to credit market. Within this framework with hidden asset accumulation, Allen
(1985) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) (ACK) show that in the pure adverse selection model
the optimal allocation of consumption coincides with the one the agents would get by insuring
themselves through borrowing and lending at a given interest rate. Abraham and Pavoni (2004)
(AP), in contrast show that, in the action moral hazard model, the e￿cient allocation of consump-
tion generically di￿ers from that arising from self insurance.2 Our empirical strategy exploits this
marked discrepancy between the two allocations under hidden assets to disentangle the nature of
the information imperfection most relevant in reality.
The fact that individual consumption satis￿es an Euler equation is a key distinguishing feature of
models with hidden assets respect to models of asymmetric information where the social planner has
information on assets and, e￿ectively, controls intertemporal trades (Rogerson, 1985; and Ligon,
1998). Because of incentive compatibility on saving decisions, both in ACK and AP, the time
series of individual consumption satis￿es the usual Euler equation. This implies that, in both
models, conditional on the past marginal utility of consumption, the current marginal utility of
consumption should not react to predictable changes in variables known to the consumer and
therefore to predictable changes in income.
The di￿erence between the two models arises in terms of the degree of insurance agents can
achieve. In ACK, agents cannot insure more than in a standard PIH model with a single asset. In
AP, agents can get some additional insurance. This additional insurance, while still maintaining
the Euler equation, can only be achieved by violating the intertemporal budget constraint with a
single asset. Another way of saying the same thing, is that the allocations in AP are equivalent to
those that would occur if the agents had access to a certain set of state contingent trades, rather
2AP also show that, in its general formulation, the action moral hazard model actually nests the ACK model of
adverse selection. This is at the essence of the common framework we propose here.
4than only to a single asset with a ￿xed interest rate. Or, if one prefers the metaphor of the social
planner, to get the standard PIH results, one should be considering income net of transfers received
from the planner, rather than the standard income concept used in the PIH literature.
In the single asset version of the self-insurance/ACK model consumption moves one to one
with permanent income. Hence, it should fully react to unexpected shocks to permanent income.3
In terms of Campbell and Deaton (1989), consumption should not display excess smoothness.
Since in the AP model consumers obtain some additional insurance relative to what they get by
self insuring with saving, consumption moves only partially to innovations to permanent income,
therefore exhibiting excess smoothness. In a situation in which ‘excess sensitivity tests’ do not
reject the martingale hypothesis for the marginal utility of consumption, we can interpret the
‘excess smoothness’ test as providing evidence on the market available to consumers. A failure to
reject the null would constitute evidence in favour of the ACK or PIH model, while evidence of
excess smoothness would be consistent with the model we present.
While in what follows we give some general results, we also present two speci￿cations of the
model (one with quadratic preferences, another with logarithmic utility) that allow the derivation
of closed form solution for consumption. These are useful because the magnitude of the excess
smoothness of consumption can be directly related to the degree of control the agent has on public
outcomes i.e., to the degree of private information the agent has (as measured by a single parame-
ter). Related to this set of issues, we also discuss how the model can be used to provide a structural
interpretation of recent empirical evidence of Blundell et al. (2004).
As our approach stresses the distinction between the orthogonality restrictions of the Euler
equation and the intertemporal budget constraint, in the empirical section of this paper, we use the
test of intertemporal budget constraints proposed by Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991) (HRS
from now on). HRS show that when (the marginal utility of) consumption follows a martingale, the
intertemporal budget constraint does impose testable restrictions on the time series properties of
consumption and income. The type of test HRS derive is related to those derived by West (1988),
Deaton and Campbell (1989) and Gali (1991). These papers interpret violations of their test as a
rejection of the life cycle/permanent income model, as they always take the intertemporal budget
constraint as given. A contribution of this paper, in addition to apply the test to micro data, is to
point out that the endogenously determined amount of risk sharing that can be observed in the
3When the agent has quadratic utility this result holds exactly for the onsumption and income in levels. If
agent’s utility is isoelastic the same implication can be derived for consumption and income in logs, using standard
approximations (e.g., Deaton, 1992)
5presence of moral hazard and hidden assets might imply a process for consumption that is smoother
than the one that would arise in a Bewley economy and could manifest itself in a violation of the
intertemporal budget constraint with a single asset. In other words, we show how to interpret a test
of an intertemporal budget constraint as a test of a market structure, and under what conditions
excess smoothness of consumption can be interpreted as risk sharing across individuals. In this
sense, in this paper we also provide a new measure of the risk sharing available if the economy.
An important feature of our test is that it shares with the HRS and West tests the fact that
it is robust to some mis-speci￿cations of the agents’ information sets. In particular, we only
need to assume that the information set the agents have and use is not smaller than that of the
econometrician. In other terms, we can allow agents to have an informational advantage over the
econometrician. We therefore have a test of market structures that is robust to mis-speci￿cation of
the agents’ information sets. As we will explain more in detail in the main body of the paper, the
Euler equation (whose validity is a unique feature of our model among the models of asymmetric
information previously proposed in the empirical literature) play a essential role in the identi￿cation
of some of the information set available to the agent. Following HRS we are then able to test the
validity of the intertemporal budget constraint along this dimension.
In addition to the HRS test, we also pursue an alternative approach based on the dynamics
of cross sectional variances of consumption and income. This approach is somewhat related to
that in Deaton and Paxson (1994), Attanasio and Jappelli (2001), Attanasio and Szekely (2004)
and Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004). However, our approach, is derived directly from the
equation from consumption levels rather than consumption changes. Moreover, as in the case of the
evidence based on the HRS test, we can give a structural interpretation to the estimated coe￿cients
of our regression, related to the importance of the moral hazard model.
Our tests are based on the identi￿cation of certain time series properties of the cross sectional
moments (means and variances) of (the marginal utility of) consumption. For this reason, we need
long time series. In the absence of su￿ciently long longitudinal data on consumption, we have
to use synthetic panels derived from long time series of cross section. In such a situation the two
approaches we propose are strongly complementary as one focuses on insurance across groups while
the other focuses on within group risk sharing.
To perform the empirical test we propose we use synthetic cohort data constructed from the
UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES). With this pseudo panel of cohort aggregated data on con-
sumption and income we estimate the parameters of a time series model for individual income and
consumption processes that can be used to perform the test proposed by HRS. We also estimate
6the relationship between the dynamics of consumption and income cross sectional variances. Using
both approaches we ￿nd evidence that is consistent with the model we describe in what follows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the building blocks of our
model. In section 3, we discuss alternative market structures: complete markets, a Bewley economy
and two di￿erent forms of endogenously incomplete markets, with observable and unobservable
assets. In Section 4 we characterizes the equilibria in the di￿erent market environments and present
some examples that yield interesting closed form solutions. In Section 5, we discuss the empirical
implications of the equilibria we considered in Section 4. In Section 6, after brie￿y presenting the
data we use, we describe our two empirical approaches and report the results we obtain with each
of them. Section 7 concludes the paper. The two appendices contain most of the proofs of the
results stated in the text.
2 Model: Tastes and technology
Consider an economy consisting of a large number of agents that are ex-ante identical, and who
each live T ￿ 1 periods. The individual income (neglecting individual indexes for notational ease)
follows the process:
yt = xt + ￿t
where xt and ￿t summarize respectively the permanent and temporary components of income shocks.
We allow for moral hazard problems to the innovations to income. We assume that each agent is
endowed with a private stochastic production technology which takes the following form:
xt = f(￿t;et): (1)
That is, the individual income shock xt 2 X can be a￿ected by the agent’s e￿ort level et 2 E ￿ <
and the shock ￿t 2 ￿ ￿ < which, consistently with previous empirical studies,4 is assumed to follow
a martingale process of the form
￿t = ￿t￿1 + v
p
t:
The i:i:d shock v
p
t can be interpreted as a permanent shock on agent’s skill level. In each period, the
e￿ort et is taken after having observed the shock ￿t: The function f is assumed to be continuous,
and increasing in both arguments. Both the e￿ort e and the shocks ￿ (hence ￿) will be considered






4See, for example, Abowd and Card (1989), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
7vT
t is a iid shock5 only observable by the individual, lt is private e￿ort (which is taken after the
realization of vT
t ), and ￿t is publicly observable.
Below, we provide a closed form where optimal e￿ort is time constant, delivering an equilibrium
individual income process of the form:




This characterization of the income process is reasonably general and in line with the perma-
nent/transitory representation of income often used in permanent income models. For expositional
simplicity, below we focus on moral hazard problems in the innovation to permanent income. We
hence assume g ￿ 0 and normalize lt to zero. Later on, we will consider the general case.
The history of income up to period t will be denoted by xt = (x1;:::;xt); while the agent’s
private history of shocks is ￿t = (￿1;:::;￿t):
Agents are born with no wealth, have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, and rank deter-




with ct 2 C and ￿ 2 (0;1): We assume u to be real valued, continuous, strictly concave, and
smooth. Moreover, we require u to be strictly increasing in c and decreasing in e. Notice that,
given a plan for e￿ort levels there is a deterministic and one-to-one mapping between histories of
the private shocks ￿t and xt; as a consequence we are entitled to use ￿t alone. Denote by ￿t the
probability measure on ￿t and assume that the law of large numbers applies so that ￿t (A) is also
the fraction of agents with histories ￿t 2 A at time t.
Since ￿t are unobservable, we make use of the revelation principle and de￿ne a reporting strategy
￿ = f￿tg
T
t=1 as a sequence of ￿t-measurable functions such that ￿t : ￿t ! ￿ and ￿t(￿t) = ^ ￿t for
some ^ ￿t 2 ￿: A truthful reporting strategy ￿￿ is such that ￿￿
t(￿t) = ￿t a.s. for all ￿t: Let ￿ be the set
of all possible reporting strategies. A reporting strategy essentially generates publicly observable





￿1 (￿1); :::; ￿t
￿
￿t￿￿
; with ht = ￿t when ￿ = ￿￿:
An allocation (￿;c;x) consists in a triplet fet;ct;xtg
T
t=1 of ￿t-measurable functions for e￿ort,
consumption and income growths (production) such that they are ‘technically’ attainable
￿ =
n





The idea behind this notation is that incentive compatibility will guarantee that the agent
announces truthfully his endowments (i.e. uses ￿￿) so that in equilibrium private histories are
5We could easily allow for v
T
t to follow an MA(d) process.
8public information. Resources feasibility implies that by the law of large numbers
E[ct] ￿ E[yt]; for all t; (2)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the measure ￿t on ￿t: Equation (2) pins down
the interest rate in this economy. For simplicity we disregard aggregate shocks, however since we
consider a production economy, the aggregate income level may change with t. We could have
considered alternative set ups: we could have assumed an exogenously given level of the interest
rate (considering a small open economy or a village economy where a money lender has access to
an external market) or even a production economy where savings takes the form of capital.6 For
what we do below, how we close the model in this dimension is not particularly important.
3 Market Arrangements
Having speci￿ed agents’ tastes and the technological environment they face, to characterize in-
tertemporal allocations we need to specify the market arrangements in which they operate. We
consider three di￿erent environments. The ￿rst two are exogenously given, while in the third the
type of trades that are feasible is derived from the details of the speci￿c information imperfection
we consider. The ￿rst environment we consider is that of complete contingent markets. We then
move on to the opposite extreme and assume that the only asset available to agents is a bond with
certain return. Finally, we consider two types of endogenously incomplete markets where trades
satisfy incentive compatibility constraints.
3.1 Full Information



















d￿t ￿ 0; (3)
where pt(￿t) is the (Arrow-Debreu) price of consumption (and income) in state ￿t; and for all
A ￿ ￿t; we have
R
A pt(￿t)d￿t = q0
t￿t(A):7 This is the price at which the agent both buys rights
6For a similar model in a small open economy see Abraham and Pavoni, 2004. For a simple analysis in a closed
economy with capital see Golosov et al., 2003.
7We have hence guessed the ‘fair price’ equilibrium. Under standard conditions such equilibrium always exists
and it is robust to the presence of asymmetric information (e.g., Bisin and Gottardi, 1999). We will disregard all
technical complications associated to the fact that we have allow for a continuum of values for ￿; and assume that C




units of consumption goods and sells (and commits to supply) yt(￿t) units of the same
good. q0
t is the period one price of a bond with maturity t, and q0
1 = 1: The budget constraint
faced by agents under complete markets makes it clear that they have available a very wide set
of securities whose return is state contingent. This richness in available assets imply that agents’





= u0 (cs(￿s);es(￿s)) for all t;s and ￿t;￿s: (4)
Since there are no aggregate shocks one can restrict attention to equilibria where q0
t are deter-







holds in each period.
3.2 Permanent Income (Self Insurance)
We call permanent income or self-insurance the allocation derived from autarchy by allowing the
agents to participate to a simple credit market. They do not have access to any asset other than
a risk free bond. Let fqtg the sequence of one period bonds prices and b = fbt+1g
T
t=1 the plan of










ct(￿t) + qtbt+1(￿t) ￿ bt(￿t￿1) + yt(￿t); (6)
where b0 = 0: As usual we rule out Ponzi games by requiring that limt!T q0
tbt(￿t) ￿ 0: The
constraint (6) is the budget restriction typically used in Permanent Income models when the agent
has only access to a risk free bond market. For future reference, notice that this problem can be
seen as an extension of the permanent-income model studied by Bewley (1977) which allows for
endogenous labor supply and non stationary income. If one wants to consider, as is often done in
the consumption literature, the case in which the return on the bond is constant (may be because
equation (2) is substituted by an open economy assumption), one can consider equation (6) with a
￿xed q; and q0
t+1 = (q)t.8
It is well known that one of the main implications of the self insurance model can be obtained
by considering the following perturbation of the agent’s consumption plan: reduce consumption




n=1 qn = q
0
tqt:
10in￿nitesimally at date t (node ￿t after et(￿t) has been taken), invest 1
qt this amount for one period,
then consume the proceeds of the investment at date t+1: If the consumption plan is optimal, this
perturbation must not a￿ect the agent’s utility level. The ￿rst-order necessary condition for his











where Et [￿] is the conditional expectation operator on future histories given ￿t:
Another necessary condition that individual intertemporal allocations have to satisfy in this
model can be derived by repeatedly applying the budget constraint (6) starting from any period
t ￿ 1 asset holding level bt we have that almost surely (a.s.) for all histories ￿ ￿T emanating from








cn(￿ ￿n) ￿ yn(￿ ￿n)
￿
￿ bt(￿ ￿t￿1): (8)
Notice that, given the income process and the sequence fqtg equations (7) and (8) de￿ne (even
when a closed form solution does not exist), consumption. It is interesting to compare equation (8)
for t = 1 with equation (3). In the complete market case, the agent has available a wide array of
state contingent securities that are linked in an individual budget constraint that sums over time and
across histories, as all trades can be made at time 1. In the permanent income model, the agent has
a single asset. This restriction on trade requires that the net present value on consumption minus
income equals the same bt = bt(￿ ￿t￿1) for all future histories emanating from node ￿ ￿t￿1: In other
terms the intertemporal transfer technology does not permit cross-subsidizations of consumption
across income histories.
3.3 Endogenously incomplete Markets
We will now consider a series of complete market economies with di￿erent assumptions on the
degree of private information.
We have in mind an equilibrium concept ￿ a la Prescott and Townsend (1984a-b) and Kehoe and
Levine (2001). We will therefore use the following de￿nition of equilibrium.




t=1 such that - given p - the agent maximizes his expected discounted utility subject to
the (Arrow-Debreu) budget constraint, and incentive compatibility constraint ICi, and all markets
clear.
11One might interpret the di￿erent degree of asymmetric information as di￿erent market arrange-
ments, i.e. as endogenous limitation on the ‘set’ of available assets. It is however important to
notice that all equilibria will be (almost by construction) constrained e￿cient. The full information
model can also be seen as a special case of this model, when the incentive compatibility constraints
are not restrictive since e￿ort is fully observable. It is easy to see indeed that in this case the only
announcement strategy consistent with (￿;c;x) is ￿￿: Below we show that the Permanent Income
allocation can also be generated as the equilibrium outcome of a special case of the moral hazard
model with hidden assets.
We assume that e￿ort is not observable. Within this environment with imperfect information
we consider two cases. In the ￿rst, private assets are observable. This is equivalent to considering a
situation where there are no private assets and all savings are done by the planner. In the second,
instead, private assets are hidden.
3.3.1 Moral Hazard with Monitorable Asset Holdings
Consider the case where each agent has private information on his/her e￿ort level e, but there is full
information on consumption and asset decisions, and trade contracts can be made conditional on
these decisions. We de￿ne the expected utility from reporting strategy ￿ 2 ￿; given the allocation

























where g(x;￿) represents the e￿ort level needed to generate x when shock is ￿; i.e., g is the inverse
of f with respect to e keeping ￿xed ￿: Since x is observable, the mis-reporting agent must adjust
his/her e￿ort level so that the lie is not detected.


















d￿t ￿ 0; (9)









￿t￿1 u(ct;et) n (￿;c;x); ￿
#
(10)
for all ￿ 2 ￿: The key di￿erence between this problem and that of full information is the incentive
constraint (10), which de￿nes the set of allocations for which the agent will be induced to tell the
truth and supplying the e￿ort plan ￿.
12In the additive separable case, u(c;e) = u(c) ￿ v(e);9 the key characteristic of the equilibrium










In order to relate (11) to the Euler equation (7), notice that the inverse (1=x) is a strictly convex









with strict inequality if ct+1 is not constant with positive probability. That is, the optimality
condition (11) is incompatible with the Euler equation (7). The optimal pure moral hazard contract
tends to front-load transfers, and agents’ consumption process behaves as it the agent were saving
constrained. This consideration may play an important role in distinguishing this allocation from
permanent income (see Ligon, 1998; and Section 4.5 below).
3.3.2 Moral Hazard with Hidden Asset Accumulation
Assume now that in addition to the moral hazard problem, agents have hidden access to a simple
credit market and consumption is not observable (and/or contractable). The agents do not have





























￿t￿1 u(^ ct;et) n (￿;c;x); ￿
#
for all ￿ 2 ￿; (12)
where the deviation for consumption ^ c must be such that the new path of consumption can be repli-
cated by a risk free bond, hence satisfy the self insurance budget constraint (6).10 It is straightfor-
ward to see that the incentive constraint (12) (considered at ￿￿) implies that the allocation (￿;c;x)
9Will explain below that this property is in fact satis￿ed by set of model speci￿cations larger than the additive
separable case.
10Formally, for any ￿; a deviation ^ c
￿ is admissible if there is a plan of bond holdings ^ b
￿ such that for all t and a.s.





































where the marginal utilities are evaluated at the equilibrium values dictated by (￿;c;x):11 Notice
that condition (14) essentially replicates (7). Clearly the Euler equation is consistent with many
stochastic processes for consumption. In particular it does not says anything about the variance of
ct. For example, the full information model satis￿es this conditions as well, and when preferences
are separable ct has zero variance. The key distinguishing feature between this allocation and the
permanent income model is the fact that the former does not satisfy the (NPVC) (8). That is, the
intertemporal budget constraint based on that single asset is violated because it ignores the state
contingent transfers implied by the constrained e￿cient equilibrium allocation.
4 Characterizing equilibria
In this section we consider the properties of the di￿erent market environments we considered and,
in particular, that of endogenously incomplete markets. We have mentioned that the equilibrium
allocations we consider are constrained Pareto e￿cient. This means that the equilibrium allocation





that solves the constrained welfare maximization problem of a benevolent social planner who can
transfers resources intertemporally at a rate qt (dictated by the aggregate feasibility constraint).









ct(￿t) = yt(￿t) + ￿t(￿t); (15)








>From condition (15) it is easy to see that the optimal allocation implies that the agents do not
trade intertemporally (bt ￿ 0): This is just a normalization. Alternatively, ￿ could be chosen so that
the transfer ￿t = ￿t(￿t) represents the net trade on state contingent assets the agent implements
at each date t node ￿t. In this case, resources feasibility would require E[￿t] = 0. In Appendix A
11This condition is the ￿rst order equivalent to the incentive constraint that prevents the controls that the agent
is not willing to deviate in assets decisions alone, while contemplating to tell the truth about shock histories ￿
t.
14we show that under some conditions the optimal allocation (￿;c;x) can be ‘implemented’ using a
transfer scheme ￿￿ which is function of income histories xt alone.12 This will simplify the analysis
and allow us to describe the consumption allocation in terms of observables. At history xt an agent
with asset level bt will face the following budget constraint
ct + qtbt+1 = xt + ￿￿
t(xt) + bt:
In what follows, we ￿rst present a speci￿c economy where we get the ‘Allen-Cole-Kocherlakota’
(ACK) result. As stressed in AP, the crucial restrictions to obtain the ‘self-insurance’ result are
on the way e￿ort is converted into output. We then move on to relax these restrictions. Within
the more general case, we consider a speci￿c parametrization of the income process that allows us
to obtain a closed form solution for the optimal transfers. While this example is useful because it
gives very sharp predictions, some of the properties of the allocations we discuss generalize to the
more general case and inform our empirical speci￿cation.
4.1 The ACK economy as a foundation of the Bewley model
It seems intuitive that our model nests that of Allen (1985). In order to clarify this link and
introduce our closed forms, we derive the ACK result within our framework. Perhaps the analysis
that follows also clari￿es further the nature the ACK self-insurance result in terms of a the degree
of asymmetric information in the economy. The following model builds on Allen’s.
The ￿rst speci￿cation regards preferences: u(c;e) = u(c ￿ e): Since consumption and e￿ort
enter the utility function in a liner fashion, e￿ectively they can be considered as essentially the
same good. The second speci￿cation, crucial in order to obtains the self-insurance result, is the use
of a production function which is linear in e￿ort and separable in the shock (the linearity in ￿ is
obviously irrelevant)
xt = f (et;￿t) = ￿t + et;
with ￿ = (￿1;￿max] and E = (￿1;emax]: Obviously, in this environment the plan ￿ of e￿ort levels
will be indeterminate. We can hence set, without loss of generality, et ￿ 0. This normalization has
two advantages. First, since et does not change with ￿t while f(￿t;et) is strictly increasing in ￿t;
all variations in ￿t will induce variations in xt, automatically guaranteeing the xt￿measurability
of c (see Appendix A). Second, an added bonus of the constant e￿ort is that we can focus on the
risk sharing dimension of the optimal allocation. This last argument also motivates the modeling
choice for our closed form solution below.
12In particular, we assume that the optimal plan of consumption c is x
t-measurable.
15We now show that, for this speci￿cation, incentive compatibility fully characterizes the e￿-
cient allocation. Assume T < 1 and consider the last period of the program. Using the budget
constraint, given any history xT￿1 we have



















The key aspect to notice here is that since utility depends on the e￿ort choice only through the
transfer, the agent will make to happen the income level xT delivering the maximal transfer. Since
this structure of production allows the agent to obtain any xT from any ￿T this will always be
possible. In addition, the preferences allow him to do it at no cost. In order to be incentive
compatible, the transfer scheme must hence be invariant across xT’s.13
Now consider the problem in period T ￿ 1: Taking into account this invariance of ￿T from xT,


























for all ^ xT￿1
This constraint says that given xT￿2 and ￿T￿1; the planner can only transfer deterministically across
time. When the agent can save and borrow he/she will induce the xT￿1 realization generating the
largest T ￿ 1 net present value of transfers. In order to see it more easily assume the transfer
scheme is di￿erentiable and write the agent’s ￿rst order conditions with respect to eT￿1 evaluated
at e￿
T = e￿




























@xT￿1 has been taken out from the expectation operator as we saw that ￿T is constant



















13Recall that the incentive constraint for e
￿























for all ^ eT 2 E:
16The discounted value of transfer must hence be constant across xT￿1 as well, that is, ￿￿
T￿1(xT￿1)+
qT￿￿
T(xT) is xT￿2-measurable. The fact that the agent faces the same interest rate of the planner
implies that for any xT￿1 incentive compatibility requires that the net present value of the transfers





t+n(xt+n) is xt￿1 measurable since it is a constant number for all history
continuations xt;xt+1;:::;xT.
Now recall that self insurance has two de￿ning properties: ￿rst, it must satisfy the Euler
equation. Second, it must satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint with one bond, i.e., the
period zero net present value must be zero for all xT.14 Since the Euler equation is always satis￿ed
here, the only way of obtaining a di￿erent allocation is that the transfers scheme ￿￿ permits to
violate the agent’s period zero self insurance intertemporal budget constraint for some history xT.
The previous argument demonstrates that it cannot be the case.15 This implies that the ‘relaxed-
optimal’ contract obtained by using the ￿rst-order-condition version of the incentive constraint
corresponds to the bond economy allocation. Since this allocation is obviously incentive compatible,
it must be the optimal one.
The intuition for this result is simple. First, as emphasized by ACK, the free access to the
credit market implies that the agent only cares about the net present value of transfers (i.e., he(she
does not care about the exact timing of transfer payments). Second, our de￿nition of the set E of
available e￿ort levels imply that at each t the agent has full control over the publicly observable
outcome xt: Moreover, the perfect substitutability between consumption and e￿ort in the utility
function on one side and between income and e￿ort in production on the other side imply that the
agent can substitute e￿ort for income at no cost. Agent’s preferences over income histories hence
only depend on the planner net present value of transfers, which must hence be constant across
histories. Making the self insurance allocation the only incentive feasible allocation. The result can
be summarized as follows.
















T￿1; and so on. The above

































n (cn ￿ yn) is one number a.s. for any history x
T. Hence, in order to satisfy resources feasibility the planner
is forced to set this number to zero.
17Proposition 1 Assume T < 1 and that agents have perfect and costless control over publicly
observable income histories. Then the e￿cient allocation coincides with self insurance. However, in
more general speci￿cations of the income process, the e￿cient allocation di￿ers from self insurance.
The ￿rst part of the proposition has been shown above. Notice that we never used the time
series properties of ￿t: Indeed this result is pretty general, and as we will see below it also applies
to the case with two type of shocks.16 In order to see an example of what is stated in the second
part of the proposition we will now generalize the production function to allow for non-linearities.
4.2 The Case with Some Risk Sharing: Excess Smoothness
Consider now the general case where the function f is left unspeci￿ed. Recall that at period t the
agent objective function is:
u(ct ￿ et) = u
￿




To gain the most basic intuition, we start by considering the ￿nal period (T) of the model. The













f (￿T; ^ eT) ￿ ^ eT + ￿￿
T
￿
xT￿1;f (￿T; ^ eT)
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0 no insurance is possible in this environment. However, in general, f0
e might be greater than one,
and this is compatible with some risk sharing. We will see that this argument translates into a
multi-period setting as well.
What is the intuition for this fact? If the planner’s aim is to make agents share risk, the key
margin for an optimal scheme is to guarantee that the agent does not shirk. That is that she does
not reduce e￿ort. The value 1
f0
e in the right hand side of (16) represents the return (in terms of
consumption) the agent derives by shirking so that to reduce output by one (marginal) unit. The
left hand side is the net consumption loss: when the marginal tax/transfer is negative the direct
16ACK, they all study the case with iid shocks. It is worth noticing, however, that in the presence of liquidity
constraints (the case considered by Cole and Kocherlakota), the extension to any persistence of shocks does not apply.
18reduction of one unit of consumption is mitigated by the increase in tax revenues. A large f0
e
reduces shirking returns making easier for the planner to satisfy the incentive compatibility, hence
to provide insurance.17
We now consider a model that uses this intuition heavily to deliver a closed form for the transfers,
both in the static and dynamic environments. Consider ￿rst the last two periods. It is easy to see




















The intuition is the same. The left had side represents the net cost of shirking while in the right
hand side we have the agent’s return from misbehaving. For the same reasons we explained above,
when f0
e > 1; the optimal scheme permits the net present value of transfers to decrease with xT;
allowing for some additional risk sharing on top of self insurance.
4.3 Closed Forms
Now consider a related special speci￿cation for f: Assume income xt depends on exogenous shocks
￿t and e￿ort et as follows:
xt = f (￿t;et) = ￿t + aminfet;0g + bmaxfet;0g; (17)
with a ￿ 1 ￿ b: In Figure 1 we represent graphically the production function f in this case. Notice
that when a = b = 1; one obtains the linear speci￿cation used to obtain the ACK result. Preferences
are as in the previous section
u(ct;et) = u(ct ￿ et):
The budget constraint obviously does not change:
ct = yt + bt + ￿t ￿ qbt+1;
where all t subscript variables are xt measurable but bt; which is xt￿1 measurable.
17An equivalent intuition, based on the revelation game, suggests that f
0
e may be related to the marginal cost
of lying. Recall that in this model xT is observable by the planner, and notice that when the agent gets the









^ ￿ but he is forced to reduce ‘consumption’













e can hence be seen
as the ‘net cost’ of lying.
19In Proposition 2 in Appendix B we show that in the case of a constant q; we get that the



































t+1 is the permanent shock on income. When u is quadratic and ￿ = q, the Euler equation
implies:
ct = Etct+s
for all s ￿ 1: From the budget constraint together with bt ￿ 0, we hence get
￿ct+1 =
(1 ￿ q)





























Hence for a = 1 we are back to the PIH, for larger a we get some more risk sharing over and above
self-insurance, with full insurance obtainable as a limit case for a ! 1.
In this example, our ability to derive a closed form solution is driven by two factors. The
assumption of quadratic utility (which, as is well known, allows one to derive closed form solution
in a standard life cycle model) and the simple concavity assumed on the income process that takes
the form of a piece-wise linear function. Such a simple function makes zero e￿ort the optimal
level the planner is trying to implement so that one can clearly separate the incentive and the risk
sharing margins. The amount of risk sharing the planner can give the agent is that amount that
does not induce the agent to shirk. If the planner tries to guarantee a bit more risk sharing, the
agent will set e￿ort equal to ￿1. For values of a close to one, the amount of risk sharing that
can be implemented is not much and, in the limit, when a approaches unity, the planner cannot do
18This formulation is independent of the relationship between the discount factor ￿ and the price of the bond q;
and of assumptions on the utility function u ( as long as u(c;e) = u(c ￿ e)). Moreover, one can easily show that the
formula can be generalized to the case where qt evolves deterministically with time. It must however be said that
without further speci￿cations the expression (18) represents only a necessary condition for optimality. See Appendix
B for details.
20better than self insurance. When a is very large, the planner can actually approach the allocation
obtainable under complete markets.
A couple of remarks regarding our speci￿cation are probably needed. First, the fact that zero
is the optimal level of e￿ort, can be interpreted as a normalization. Second, at the optimal level of
e￿ort, the income process is actually identical to the standard income process used in the permanent
income literature, with the innovation to permanent income equal to the random variable ￿t:
4.4 Introducing Temporary Shocks





: Let specify a production function







t + aT minflt;0g + bT maxflt;0g with aT > 1 > bT;
f as in (17), and the following agent’s preferences over ct; lt and et : u(ct ￿ lt ￿ et): We can now
follow a similar line of proof than that adopted for the permanent shock (see Appendix B), and














where, for consistency, we denoted by ap the slope of f for et ￿ 0:
Interestingly, our closed form with temporary shocks provides a structural interpretation of
recent empirical evidence. Using the evolution of the cross sectional variance and covariance of
consumption and income, Blundell et al. (2004) estimate two parameters representing respectively
the fraction of permanent and temporary shocks re￿ected into consumption. Within our model
such estimated parameters can be interpreted as the severity of informational problems to income
shocks of di￿erent persistence.19
4.5 The Case with Isoelastic Utility
We now discuss again the simpler version of the model with only permanent shocks, but assume
that agents have isoelastic preferences. Full details are to be found in Appendix C. Let us assume










for ￿ > 1; and E0
X
t=0
￿t (lnCt ￿ lnNt) for ￿ = 1;
19Blundel et al. use the log formulation of the model, which we will develop below.
21and that the production function is represented by a relatively small departure from the Cobb-
Douglas:
Xt = ￿tNa
t for Nt ￿ 1; and Xt = ￿tNb
t for Nt ￿ 1; with a > 1 > b;
where, abusing in notation:





t is normally distributed with zero mean and variance ￿2
vp. We are able to obtain a very
similar closed form for discounted taxes, which lead to the following permanent income formulation
for ￿ = q and T very large20









The ￿rst noticeable di￿erence it of course that all variables are expressed in logs. Moreover, the
presence of precautionary saving motive implies that the e￿cient allocation to displays increasing
(log) consumption. Notice interestingly, that in this case a > 1 permits both to reduce the cross
sectional dispersion of consumption and to mitigates the precautionary saving motives, hence the
steepness of consumption (i.e., ‘intertemporal dispersion’). The model implies a very tight rela-
tionship between these two moments. Finally, notice that for a = 1 we obtain the same expression
derived through approximations in the self insurance literature (e.g., Deaton, 1992, and Banks et
al., 2001, and Blundell et al., 2004). It is hence in this approximate sense that we are able to ‘test’
the self insurance model in the empirical analysis based on our closed form solution in logs.21
Observable Assets. The further interesting aspect of this formulation in logs is that, under the
same assumptions on preferences and technology, when assets are monitorable, for ￿ = q we get the
20The derivation follows closely that in levels, and uses the log normality of shocks to ￿t in order to get a closed
form expression for the Euler equation (in logs) and the discounted value of taxes. For ￿ = q; when consumption is









c is the conditional variance of ￿lnCt+1 and ￿ is the coe￿cient of risk aversion.


























21Strictly speaking, the assumptions of Proposition 1 are not satis￿ed in our speci￿cation o the income process for
the case with isoelastic utility, not even for a = 1: Hence the necessity to appeal to approximations.






i.e., the trend in log consumption is now negatively a￿ected by consumption dispersion.22
Before moving to the empirical speci￿cation, we note that even when the income process is
more general than the one that yields a closed form solution, the general results that the planner
can provide agents with more insurance than the Permanent Income model typically holds in the
class of moral hazard models we are considering. This fact is important for our empirical approach.
5 Empirical Implications of the Model
The main implication of the ideas discussed in the previous sections is that in a model with moral
hazard and hidden saving, the typical consumer is able to insure more of her idiosyncratic risk than
in the standard permanent income model in which individuals can transfer resources over time using
a single asset with a given interest rate, even though the presence of the information asymmetries
prevents ￿rst best allocations to be achievable. We also noticed that with hidden assets the Euler
equation for consumption will always hold. In the standard Permanent Income model with a single
asset that pays a ￿xed interest rate, intertemporal allocations are completely pinned down by the
Euler equation and the intertemporal budget constraint. Therefore, if the consumer has to get some
additional insurance while at the same time the Euler equation holds, it has to be the case that the
IBC with a single asset has to be violated.23 And within the class of models we are considering, it
has to be violated in a way that gives additional insurance. This implies having consumption higher
than under the PIH when shocks are ‘bad’ and lower when shocks are ‘good’. Notice also that this
implies that the consumer reacts less than under the PIH to innovation to permanent income, that
is consumption is ‘excessively’ smooth. In this sense our model can explain a result in the empirical
literature on consumption: Campbell and Deaton (1989) and West (1988) had stressed the fact
that consumption did not seem to be reactive enough to permanent innovations to income.
>From these considerations, it also follows that our model has very di￿erent implications than
one with observable assets, as studied, for instance, by Ligon (1998). In our case, the Euler
equation holds while in a model with observable assets it does not, as shown in equation (11). With
observable assets, all saving is e￿ectively done by the social planner who then allocates consumption
22It is not di￿cult to derive the expression for the speci￿cation of preferences (and income) delivering our closed
form. Details are available upon request. Regarding the discrepancies on consumption patterns between our model
and that with observable assets see also AP for an analysis based on simulations.
23More formally, the equality version of condition (8) is violated for some histories of shocks.
23to agents with a system of transfers that guarantees that incentive compatibility (only with respect
to e￿ort) is satis￿ed. When assets are hidden, the set of incentive compatibility constraints must
be amended so that to include (at least) the Euler equation with the interest rate provided by the
hidden intertemporal transfer technology because such a margin is always available to the agents.
The Euler equation (7) has been used extensively in testing the PIH. It can be derived and
holds under a variety of situations. In particular, the Euler equation holds whenever the agent is
not at a corner with respect to the decision of holding the asset whose return is being considered.
It is important to stress that this result holds regardless of the availability of other assets or of
the presence of imperfections in the trading of di￿erent assets. Situations where the equation does
not hold include the presence of exogenous liquidity constraints (which e￿ectively means that the
agent is at a corner as she would like to borrow more than what is allowed on the market) and the
model with asymmetric information and observed savings.
An attractive features of the Euler equation is that it implies some strong orthogonality con-
ditions that have been used extensively both to estimate preference parameters and to test the
model. According to the model, innovations to marginal utility between time t and t + 1 have to
be uncorrelated with all information available to the consumer at time t. By the law of iterated
expectations, this type of test does not require the exact speci￿cation of the agents information set,
as long as such a set includes the variables observed by the econometrician. This logic has been
used to derive the so-called excess sensitivity tests of the permanent income model: consumption,
conditional on lagged consumption should not be related on any other lagged variable, including
those that help to predict income.
Excess sensitivity tests and more generally the Euler equation approach to estimating the para-
meters and testing the implications of the PIH do not require the existence of a closed form solution
for consumption. An implication of this, however, is that the Euler equation is silent about the
way in which innovations to (permanent) income are translated into innovations into consumption.
When a closed form solution for consumption is available, however, it is possible to derive the
implications for the correlation between contemporaneous income and consumption. The standard
case that has been extensively studied in the literature is that of quadratic utility case with a ￿xed
interest rate. In such a situation, given a time series process for income, the intertemporal budget
constraint and the Euler equation for consumption will induce a set of cross equation restrictions
on the joint representation of consumption and income. This is the strategy behind Flavin (1981)
and, subsequently, Campbell (1987). As we discussed above, a similar strategy can be followed with
more general utility functions if one is willing to rely on approximations. Blundell and Preston
24(1998) and Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004) exploit the relationship between income shocks
and consumption innovations to study the evolution over time of cross sectional second moments.
In addition to the cross equation restrictions stressed by Flavin (1981), one can consider other
restrictions implied by the PIH. In particular, Campbell and Deaton (1989) and West (1988),
pointed out that, if current income has a permanent component, consumption should fully adjust
to innovations to such component, because they are fully re￿ected in permanent income. These
studies then go on to show that, at least in aggregate data, consumption seems to be excessively
smooth, in that it does not react to innovations in permanent income. Campbell and Deaton (1989)
also point out that, if one takes as valid the intertemporal budget constraint, excess smoothness
can be related to excess sensitivity, in that the failure of consumption to react to innovations to
permanent income can be recasted, if one imposes the intertemporal budget constraint, in terms of
predictability of consumption changes with lagged information.
Our approach is obviously related to these papers. However, in our theoretical model, the
intertemporal budget constraint with a single risk-free asset does not necessarily hold. Indeed,
the additional insurance consumers get in our model relatively to a Bewley model is obtained by
violating such intertemporal budget constraint: consumers with positive innovations to permanent
income would consume quantities that are below what would be predicted by the PIH, while
consumers with negative innovations would consume in excess of what would be predicted by the
PIH. Notice that these deviations e￿ectively imply what has been de￿ned as excess smoothness of
consumption. At the same time, however, consumption allocations would satisfy the Euler equation
for consumption and therefore would not show ’excess sensitivity’. The deviation of consumption
allocations that our model have from the predictions of the standard PIH would hence be very
di￿erent from the directions observed under binding liquidity constraints.
A study that explicitly tests the empirical implications of intertemporal budget constraints is the
paper by Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991) (HRS). HRS show two important results. First, given
a consumption and income process and an asset that pays a ￿xed interest rate, it is not possible to
test the implications of the intertemporal budget constraints without imposing additional structure.
Second, and more importantly for us, if the income process is exogenous and the consumption
process is determined by a linear-quadratic model, so that consumption follows a martingale, the
intertemporal budget constraint imposes additional restrictions on the joint process of income and
consumption. In this sense the implications of the Euler equation (which informs many of the so-
called excess sensitivity tests), and the additional restriction implied by the intertemporal budget
25constraint are distinct. 24 The test of the intertemporal budget constrained proposed by HRS is
equivalent to some of the tests of excess smoothness in the literature. We can use it within our
context and interpret as test of market structure: the null considered in this test is the Bewley
model, while the speci￿c alternative implied by ‘excess smoothness’ would be an implication of the
market structure that would prevail under moral hazard with hidden assets. We now make these
connections precise.
5.1 Explaining ‘excess’ smoothness
HRS consider an income process yt which is one element of the information structure available to
the consumer and assume that it admits the following representation:25
(1 ￿ L)yt ￿ ￿yt = ￿(L)wt (24)
where wt is a n￿dimensional vector of orthogonal covariance stationary random variable that
represent the information available to the consumer. ￿(L) is a 1 ￿ n vector of polynomials in the
lag operator L. The martingale restriction on the process for consumption implies that consumption
can be represented by:
￿ct = ￿w1t (25)
where (wt has been chosen so that) w1t is the ￿rst element of wt and ￿ is a scalar di￿erent from
zero. Notice that equation (25) does not include lags. The coe￿cient ￿ represents the extent to
which income news are re￿ected into consumption. It is useful to decompose the right hand side
of equation (24) into its ￿rst component and the remaining ones:
￿yt = ￿1(L)w1t + ￿2(L)w2t (26)
HRS show that, given this structure, the NPV implies some restrictions on the coe￿cients of
equations (25) and (26) In particular, the intertemporal budget constraint implies that:
￿ = ￿1(q) (27)
24The HRS result is true for the levels of consumption. However, the analysis we perform in Section 4.5 implies
that a similar results holds (under di￿erent parametric restrictions for preferences) for the same set of varible in logs.
25HRS work with a slightly more general framework where the income process is made stationary by the transfor-
mation ￿(L); which we are assuming to be equal to (1￿L): In what follows, we adopt only in part the HRS notation
and adapt it to ours. In particular, we start from a representation for the income process that has already been
rotated so that its ￿rst component represents the innovation for the martingale process that generates consumption.
At a more trivial level, we use y and c for income and consumption instead of r and p:
26￿2(q) = 0 (28)
HRS show that restriction (27) is testable, while restriction (28) is not, in that there exist other
representations for income, that are observationally equivalent to (26) for which the restriction
holds by construction.
The theoretical structure we have illustrated in the previous section provides a new interpreta-
tion to the ‘excess smoothness’ test and to the HRS test. Notice the similarity of equations (17)
and (20) to equations (25) and (26).26 Our contribution is to point out that the HRS test of the
NPV is e￿ectively a test about the market structure. The null considered by HRS corresponds
to the Bewley model we considered in Section 3.2, which also corresponds to a special case of our
model (see Section 4.1). We also point out that the model with moral hazard generates a speci￿c
deviation from the null that is consistent with much of the evidence obtained in this literature. The
alternative hypothesis that ￿ < ￿1(q) is equivalent to what Campbell and Deaton (1989) and West
(1988) de￿ne as ‘excess smoothness’ of consumption.27 The model we present implies ￿1(q)=￿ = a:
The extent of ’excess smoothness’ has in our context, at least for this example, a structural in-
terpretation. It represents the severity of the incentive problem. As we discuss above, when a is
much larger than 1, one gets a considerable amount of risk sharing, and, in the limit case, one
gets full insurance. This is because the return to shirk is very low, the social planner hence ￿nds
it relatively easy to motivate agents to work hard, and can provide more insurance. On the other
extreme, when a is close to unity, the allocations are similar to those that one would observe under
the PIH.
An important feature of the HRS approach is that the test of the NPV restriction does not
require the econometrician to identify all information available to the consumer. Intuitively, the
test uses two facts. First, under the null the intertemporal budget constraint with a single assets
must hold whatever is the information set available to the agent. Second, under the assumption that
the agent has no coarser information than the econometrician, the validity of the Euler equation
implies that consumption innovation reveals part of the information available to the agent. By
26In particular, set ￿ =
1
a; w1t = v
p
t ; ￿1 (L) = 1; and ￿2 (L) = 0:
27Another paper that is related to our empirical strategy is Gali (1991), who imposes the intertemporal budget
constraint on top of the Euler equation for consumption so to derive a test that uses only data on consumption. The
intertermporal budget constraint is used to derive the relationship between the spectral density at zero frequency
of consumption and the variance of innovations to permanent income. While Gali (1991), as Campbell and Deaton
(1989), interpret his test as a test of the PIH (in various incarnations) this is because he takes for granted the
intertemporal budget constraint with a single asset.
27following the HRS strategy we perform a test of the intertemporal budget constraint along the
dimensions of information identi￿ed via the Euler equation (which is not zero as long as insurance
markets are not complete).
While the structural interpretation we have just given only holds for the particular example
we have considered, as we explained in Section 4.2 the intuition about the relationship between
excess smoothness and the trade-o￿ between incentives and insurance is more general. Unless we
are in a situation in which the optimal e￿ort is at higher levels than what would prevail under
the PIH (maybe because of some type of complementarity between shocks and e￿ort and negative
wealth e￿ects) the intuition will be valid. It should also be noticed that while the speci￿c income
process we consider seems special, the income process we get in equilibrium from such an example
is identical to the income process that is typically used in the PIH literature.
Equation (25) can be solved for w1t and the result substituted in (26) to get:
￿yt = ￿(L)￿ct + "t (29)
where ￿(L) = ￿(L)=￿ and "t = ￿2(L)w2t: Expressed in terms of the quantities in equation (29) the
restriction (27) will be:
￿(q) = 1 (30)
where q = 1=(1 + r): The test in (30) is very simple to implement and has recently been used by
Nalewaik (2004) as a test of the PIH.
The representation in equations (25) and (26) is derived under the assumption that preferences
are time separable. When this is not the case, maybe because of the presence of multiple con-
sumption goods some of which are durables and some create habits, HRS (Section 4) show how to
generalize equation (25) to the following representation for total consumption expenditure:
￿ct = ￿ (L)w1t (31)
where c in equation (31) represents total consumption expenditure, which enters the budget con-
straint, while utility is de￿ned over the consumption services which, in turn are a function of
current and, possibly, past expenditure. The polynomial in the lag operator  (L) re￿ects these
non-separabilities. In this case, the NPV restriction takes the same form as in equation (27). An
MA structure in the consumption equation can also be obtained in the presence of i.i.d. taste
shocks to the instantaneous utility function, as discussed, for instance, in Attanasio (1999).
285.2 Reformulating the intertemporal budget constraint
The fact that assets are unobservable makes the moral hazard models we are considering very
close to the PIH, which is one aspect of the ACK results. Indeed, as we showed, there is a set of
parameter values that makes the allocations of the two models equivalent. A useful way to re-write
the intertemporal budget constraint faced by a consumer is as a sequence of period to period budget
constraints where the consumer receives, in addition to her earnings, the contingent transfers made
by the social planner:
￿t(xt) + yt ￿ ct + bt ￿ qtbt+1 (32)
where bt is the amount held in the hidden saving technology, which pays an exogenously given
return r, and ￿t(xt) is the state contingent transfer that the consumer receives from the social
planner. Such sequence of transfers and the corresponding consumption allocations will satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint (14). The advantage of re-writing the intertemporal budget











must be part of the incentive compatibility constraints. Moreover, many of the standard results
one gets for the standard Permanent Income model can be applied here, considering the transfer
as a part of the income process.28 For instance, suppose that utility in consumption is quadratic.29
De￿ne total income, including the (net) transfer ￿t(xt), as e yt = ￿t(xt) + yt. If the return on the
(hidden) intertemporal transfer technology is constant and equal to 1
q ￿ 1; then consumption at
time t will be given by:








Equation (34) is derived using the Euler equation for quadratic utility and the intertemporal budget
constraint (32) and implies that changes in consumption are equal to the present discounted value
of revised expectations about future values of e yt: Equation (34) also makes it clear why the test of
the intertemporal budget constraint is informative in this context. If one could observe income net
of all the planner transfers e yt = ￿t(xt)+yt; and where to formulate the excess smoothness test using
28Notice that, as long as the utility function is additively separable in e￿ort and consumption, the fact that income
and the transfer are endogenously determined does not prevent us from using the PIH results, as we can obtain
them conditioning on the equilibrium level of income and transfers. Of course, the same is true for our closed form
speci￿cation, since e￿ort is constant in equilibrium.
29Moreover assume thet either u(c;e) is additive separable or we are in the case considered in Section 4.3.
29this de￿nition of income, one should not get a rejection of the null hypothesis. Using the notation
above, one would get that ￿ = ￿1(q): These considerations suggest an empirical strategy based on
alternative de￿nitions of income. The net transfers made by the social planners are obviously a
metaphor that allow us not to be speci￿c about the particular decentralized instruments agents
use in reality. These transfers therefore may include a variety of ‘income’ sources, ranging from
interpersonal transfers, to public transfers to the (net) purchases of state contingent assets. One
could then start from de￿nitions of income that do not include any form of shock related transfers,
such as gross income to move on to alternative de￿nitions that include explicit or implicit smoothing
mechanisms, such as taxes and bene￿ts and interpersonal transfers. One should then ￿nd more
‘excess’ smoothness using de￿nitions of income that do not include smoothing mechanisms.
5.3 Using Cross-Sectional Variances
The empirical implications stressed so far refer to the means of consumption and income. An
equation such as (29) relates the time series means of consumption and income. For reasons that
will become obvious, it might also be useful to consider the implications of the theory for the cross
sectional variances of income and consumption. For this purpose, it is particularly useful the closed


















+ ￿i + zt; (35)
where we should stress that we do not allow the price of a bond q to change with time, or any
sort of heterogeneity in the crucial parameter a. The term ￿i generalizes the expression in the
Appendix by adding some form of ex-ante heterogeneity, which could capture distributional issues,
the initial level of assets of individual i; or unobserved individual variables (all observables can of
course be included in the model, and the relative variances identi￿ed independently, see Attanasio
and Jappelli, 1998). Notice that we allow for possible di￿erences in the taste parameters ￿ and
￿. The term zt allows for aggregate shocks, which will be assumed to be orthogonal to individual










: If we compute the cross-sectional variance at time t of both sides of





















































are time invariant. These two
assumptions are not particularly strong. For instance, if all agents within the group over which the










can be obtained by assuming constant Pareto weights (and
unobservables) across agents in the same group (like in our theoretical model).






￿V ar(xt) + (2t + 1)V ar(￿) +
2
a
Cov (xt;￿) + 2Cov (￿;￿) (37)
where we used (t + 1)
2 ￿ t2 = 2t + 1:





More in general, we could take the second di￿erence and obtain an identi￿cation of the degree of
cross-sectional heterogeneity in ￿ via the intercept of the following regression:30
￿2V ar(ct) =
1
a2￿2V ar(xt) + 2V ar(￿): (39)
Notice that equations (37), (38) and (39) allow the identi￿cation of the structural parameter a;
which re￿ects the severity of the moral hazard problem. As noted by Deaton and Paxson (1994),
under perfect risk sharing, the cross sectional variance of consumption is constant over time. Under
the PIH, as pointed out by Blundell and Preston (1998), the changes in the variance of consumption
re￿ect changes in the variance of (permanent) income. Here, we consider a speci￿c alternative to
the perfect insurance hypothesis that implies that consumption variance grows, but less than the
increase in the variance of permanent income.
In the presence of transitory shocks, the tests based on equations (37), (38) and (39) remain
valid under the assumption that the variance of transitory shocks does not change over time.31 If
that assumption were to be violated, then one would have to identify the fraction of the variance of
30A similar expression could be obtained, under the assumption of homogeneous ￿ and ￿ while allowing for time-
changing variance of individual income ￿
2













Details are available upon request.















































; Cov (xt;￿t) and V ar(￿t) are time invariant (as it is the case
in our model), the analysis we performed in the main text remains valid, with exactly the same interpretations for
the coe￿cients. Of course, since ￿V ar(￿t) = 0 we would have ￿V ar(xt) = ￿V ar(yt); hence only the a
p(= a) can
be identi￿ed.
31income accounted for by permanent and transitory income using longitudinal data and then relate
each of them to the evolution of consumption inequality. The empirical strategy we follow here is
quite di￿erent from Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2005). They study the evolution of the cross
sectional variance of consumption growth,32 while we start from the speci￿cation for consumption
levels in equation (35) to derive equations (38) and (39).
6 Empirical strategy and results
The time series properties for income and consumption we discussed in the previous sections are
derived, for the most part, from the maximization problem of an individual consumer. Ideally,
therefore, one would like to use individual level data to estimate the relevant parameters and test
the restrictions implied by the alternative theories. The main di￿culty that arises in pursuing such
a strategy, however, is the lack of long longitudinal data on consumption. A long time horizon
is clearly crucial to estimate the time series properties of income and consumption without using
unduly restrictive assumptions. In the available micro data sources, however, either the longitudinal
dimension of the data is very short (like in the data from the UK we use below) or the information
on consumption is very limited (like in the PSID, which many people have used). To overcome
this di￿culty we follow two di￿erent strategies. Both of them involve the creation of synthetic
cohort data or pseudo-panels, along the lines proposed by Deaton (1985) and Browning, Deaton
and Irish (1985). That is, as we cannot follow the same individuals over time, we will form groups
and follow moments of the variables of interest for these groups, that will be assumed to have, in
the population, constant membership over time. The sample moments, therefore, will approximate
the corresponding population moments.
The ￿rst strategy will be based on the dynamics of cell means, while the second uses cell
variances. The two tests, while allowing us to estimate the same structural parameter a, have
a di￿erent focus. The ￿rst focuses on insurance across groups, as it exploits variation in group
mean for consumption and income. The second, focuses on insurance within a group, as it exploits
variation in the cross sectional distributions of consumption (and income) within a group. The two
tests, therefore, are complements, rather than substitute. Before describing the two approaches in
detail, we discuss brie￿y the data we use for these exercise.
32This has important advantages, but it forces to use the approximation V ar(￿ct) ￿ ￿V ar(ct).
326.1 The data
Our main source is the UK Family Expenditure Survey from 1974 to 2002. The FES is a time
series of repeated cross sections which is collected for the main purpose of computing the weights
for the Consumer Price Index. Each survey consists of about 7,000 contacted over two-week periods
throughout the year. We use data on households headed by individuals born in the 1930s, 1940s,
1950s and 1960s to form pseudo panels for 4 year of birth cohorts. As we truncate the samples so to
have individuals aged between 25 and 60, the four cohorts form an unbalanced sample. The 1930s
cohort is observed over later periods of its life cycle and exits before the end of our sample , while
the opposite is true for the 1960s cohort. A part from the year of birth, the other selection criteria
we used for this study is marital status. As we want to study relatively homogeneous groups, we
excluded from our sample unmarried individuals. We also excluded the self-employed.
These data, which has been used in many studies of consumption (see, for instance, Attanasio
and Weber, 1993), contains detailed information on consumption, income and various demographic
and economic variables. We report results obtained two di￿erent de￿nitions of consumption. The
￿rst uses as ‘consumption’ expenditure on non durable items and services, in real terms and divided
by the number of adult equivalents in the households (where for the latter we use the McClemens
de￿nition of adult equivalents). The second also includes the expenditure on durables. For income,
we also consider di￿erent de￿nitions. In particular, we start with gross earnings, to move on to gross
earnings plus bene￿ts and ￿nally net earnings plus bene￿ts. As mentioned above, the idea behind
using di￿erent de￿nitions of income is to gain insights on the role played in terms of providing
insurance by di￿erent mechanisms, such as the bene￿t or the tax system.
As households are interviewed every week throughout the year, the FES data are used to
construct quarterly time series. This allows us to exploit a relatively long time series horizon.
6.2 The HRS approach
We follow HRS in that we estimate the equations (26) and (25) - or (26) and (31) - by Maximum
Likelihood, assuming normality of the relevant residuals and implementing a state space repre-
sentation of the system. However, some important modi￿cations of the standard procedure are
necessary, induced by the fact that we are using micro level data and by the fact that we do not
have longitudinal data. To address these two problems, we use the approach recently developed by
Attanasio and Borella (2006).
We start by noting that we do not observe the quantities on the left-hand-side of equations
(26) and (25), as our data do not have a longitudinal dimension. However, identifying groups of
33￿xed membership, we can de￿ne the (population) means (or other moments) for these groups. In
particular, given an individual variable zh
gt (where the index h refers to the individual and the index
g to the group), we can state, without loss of generality:
zh
gt = zgt + ￿h
gt
where the ￿rst term on the right hand side de￿nes the population group mean. We do not
observe zgt; but we can obtain a consistent estimate e zct of it from our sample. This will di￿er from
the population mean by an error whose variance can be consistently estimated given the within cell
variability and cell size (see Deaton, 1985). The presence of this measurement error in the levels will
induce an additional MA(1) component in the time series behavior of the changes in the variables
of interest. The variability of this component will have to be taken into account when estimating
the parameters of the model. We do so by assuming that the information on within cell variability
provides an exact measurement of the variance of this component. As discussed in Attanasio and
Borella (2006), given the sample size involved, such an assumption is not a very strong one. Given
the known values for the variance covariance matrix of the sampling error component, the likelihood
function of the MA system in (26) and (25) can be computed using the Kalman ￿lter (for details
see Attanasio and Borella (2006)).
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where the two unobserved factors w1;gt and w2;gt are independent over time and with one another.
We allow for correlation between the w of di￿erent cohorts observed at the same time. In system
(40), we only allowed two lags of each of the two factors for the sake of notational simplicity, but
larger number of lags can be considered without any problem. As we estimate the variance of w1;gt
and w2;gt we normalize the coe￿cients ￿
yc
0 and ￿cc
0 to 1. Moreover, as is standard in multivariate
system, for identi￿cation we need to restrict one of the coe￿cients governing the contemporaneous
between consumption and income changes to be zero. We follow HRS and set ￿
cy
0 = 0:33 This
assumption on the one hand imposes a triangular structure on the contemporaneous correlation,
and on the other identi￿es the factor w2;gt as an ‘income’ shock.
33Attanasio and Borella (2006) set to zero the contemporaneous coe￿cient of w2t in the income equation, choosing
the opposite triangular structure.
34The martingale property of consumption implies that the coe￿cient on lagged shocks in the
second equation of the system (40) should be zero. However, as discussed in HRS, the presence of
durability in some components of consumption could lead to a speci￿cation where lagged coe￿cients
on w1 (￿cc
1 and ￿cc
2 in our system (40))are di￿erent from zero. However, the coe￿cients on lagged
values of w2 should be zero. This hypothesis can be tested and results of such a test can be
interpreted as ‘excess sensitivity’ tests. This is important both because this test corresponds to a
test of the Euler equation and because, as stressed by HRS, if consumption does not satisfy the
martingale property implied by the Euler equation, we cannot meaningfully test the intertemporal
budget constraint.
Imposing all these restrictions, the system can be written as follows:
￿ygt =￿
yy
0 w1gt + ￿
yy
1 w1gt￿1 + ￿
yy
2 w1gt￿2 + w2gt + ￿
yc
1 w2gt￿1 + ￿
yc
2 w2gt￿2 (41)
￿cgt =w1gt + ￿cc






















A; Cov(wi;kt;wi;jt) = ￿i;jk; i = 1;2:
In section 5, we showed how the equations for consumption and income that make the systems
of equation (40) is very similar to the equations of the closed form system we obtain in Section 4
(equations (17) and (20)). Those equations where derived in levels. In Section 4.5, we showed how
similar expressions can be derived for the log of income and consumption. We now show both the
results in levels and in logs.
6.2.1 Results in levels
In Tables 1 and 2 we report the estimates we obtain estimating the MA system (40) by Maximum
Likelihood. As we allow the variance covariance matrix in the system to be cohort speci￿c, we
limit the estimation to cohorts that are observed over a long time period. This meant to use a
balanced pseudo panels with two cohorts: that born in the 1940s and that born in the 1950s. We
experimented with several speci￿cations that di￿ered in terms of the number of lags considered in
the system. The most general speci￿cation included up to eight lags in both the consumption and
income equation. However, no coe￿cient beyond lag 2 was either individually or jointly signi￿cant.
In the Table, therefore, we focus on the speci￿cation with 2 lags.
In the tables we impose the restriction that the coe￿cients on the lagged value of w2t are zero.
While we do not report the results for the sake of brevity, this restriction is never violated in our
data. The estimated coe￿cients are small in size and never signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, either
35individually or jointly. This is an important result as it correspond to a non-violation of the excess
sensitivity test.
Table 1 uses as a de￿nition of consumption the expenditure on non-durables and services. We
use three di￿erent de￿nitions of income. The ￿rst is gross earnings, the second gross earnings plus
bene￿ts (such as unemployment insurance and housing bene￿ts) and the third is net earnings plus
bene￿ts. For each of the three de￿nitions we report two speci￿cations: one with 2 lags in each of
the two equations and one where the insigni￿cant coe￿cients are restricted to zero.
Several interesting elements come out of the Table. First, the dynamics of income is richer than
that of consumption. However, and perhaps surprisingly, the coe￿cients on the lags of w2gt are
not statistically signi￿cant and are constrained to zero in columns 2, 4 and 6. In the consumption
equation the coe￿cient on the ￿rst lag of w1gt is consistently signi￿cant and attracts a negative
sign. As discussed above, this could be a sign of intertemporal non-separability of preference, maybe
induced by some elements of non durable consumption to have some durability at the quarterly
frequency.
The test of the intertemporal budget constraint, which is parametrized as ￿ (q)￿￿1(q) clearly
shows the presence of excess smoothness. Interestingly, such evidence is stronger for gross earnings.
The value of the test does not change much when we add to gross earnings bene￿ts (as in columns
3 and 4). However, when we consider net earnings plus bene￿ts, the value of the test is greatly
reduced in absolute value (moving from -0.49 to -0.26), although still statistically di￿erent from zero.
Therefore, when we use a de￿nition of income that includes an important smoothing mechanism,
we ￿nd much less evidence of consumption ‘excess smoothness’ relative to that income de￿nition.
Table 2 mirrors the content of Table 1, with the di￿erence that the de￿nition of consumption we
use now includes the expenditure on durables. The results we obtain are, in many ways, similar to
those of Table 1. Perhaps surprisingly, the coe￿cient on lagged w1gt in the consumption equation is
smaller in absolute value than in Table 1 and for two of the three income de￿nitions, not statistically
di￿erent from zero. The most interesting piece of evidence, however, is that the coe￿cient that
measures excess smoothness is now considerably lower, indicating less consumption smoothing
relative to the null of the Bewley model. This is suggestive of the fact that durables might be
playing an important role in the absorption of shocks, as speculated, for instance by Browning and
Crossley (2004). However, when we consider di￿erent income de￿nitions, the evidence is consistent
with that reported in Table 1, in that relative to net earnings consumption exhibit much less ‘excess
smoothness’ than relative to gross earnings.
366.2.2 Results in logs
When re-estimating the system using the speci￿cation in logs, we try to use the same sample used
in the speci￿cation in levels. However, as we aggregate the non linear relationship (that is we take
the group average of logs), we are forced to drop observations that have zero or negative income.
A part from this, the sample is the same. We report our estimates in Table 4. Given the evidence
on the dynamics of consumption discussed above, we only report the results for total consumption,
which includes the expenditure on durables. Results for non durables and services are available
upon request from the authors. The evidence is consistent with that of Table 2 in levels in that we
do ￿nd evidence of excess smoothness. The drop in the size of the excess smoothness parameter
when we move to de￿nitions of income that include some smoothing mechanisms is even more
dramatic than in Table 2. In the last column, corresponding to net earnings plus bene￿ts, the
excess smoothness parameter, while still negative, is insigni￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
6.3 The dynamics of consumption variances
The estimation of equation (38) also requires the identi￿cation of groups. Here the group implicitly
de￿nes the participants in a risk sharing arrangement and the test will identify the amount of risk
sharing within that group. As with the estimation of the HRS system, the lack of truly longitudinal
data and the use of time series of cross sections, implies that the estimated variances (for income
and consumption) will have an error component induced by the variability of the sample. This
is particularly important for the changes in the variance of income on the right hand side: the
problem induced is e￿ectively a measurement error problem which induces a bias in the estimated
coe￿cient.









gt = V ar(xgt) ￿ V ar(xgt); and "c
gt = V ar(cgt) ￿ V ar(cgt): Analogous considerations will
hold for equations (37) and (39). The variance of the residuals " will go to zero as the size of the
cells in each time period increases. Moreover, information on the within cell variability can be used
to correct OLS estimates of the coe￿cients in equation (42). In particular, a bias correct estimator
will be given by the following expression:
b ￿ = A￿1[e ￿ ￿ B] (43)
where e ￿ = (Z0Z)￿1Z0w is the OLS estimator, B allows for the possibility of correlation between
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In computing the variance covariance matrix of this estimator it will be necessary to take into
account the MA structure of the residuals as well as the possibility that observations for di￿erent
groups observed at the same time will be correlated.
To estimate the parameters in equation (42) we use the same sample we used for the HRS test,
with the only di￿erence that we do not limit ourself to the balanced pseudo panel but use four
cohorts, although the youngest and oldest are only used for part of the time period. Otherwise the
selection criteria used to form our sample are the same as above.
The results are reported in Table 4. There are four columns in the Table, each reporting the slope
coe￿cient of equation (38) and the implied a with the corresponding standard errors. The standard
error of a is computed by the delta method. In the ￿rst two columns, we use expenditure on non
durables and services as our de￿nition of consumption. In the second column, total consumption is
divided by the number of adult equivalents. In the third and fourth column we report the results
obtained using total expenditure as our de￿nition of consumption. Once more, in the second of these
two columns the total is divided by the number of adult equivalents. The three panels correspond
to the same three de￿nitions of income we used for the HRS test.
The ￿rst thing to note is that all the slope coe￿cients are positive and statistically di￿erent
from zero. Moreover, consistently with the theory, they all imply a value of a greater than unity.
Finally, the results are a￿ected only minimally by the consideration of adult equivalents.
If we analyze the di￿erence across income de￿nitions we ￿nd results that are consistent with
the implications of the model and, by and large, with the evidence from the HRS approach. The
coe￿cient on the changes in the variance of gross earnings is much smaller than the one on the
other income de￿nitions. This is consistent with the evidence from Tables 1 and 2 which showed
more ‘excess smoothness’ for this de￿nition. Unlike in Table 1 and 2, however, the main di￿erence
in the size of the coe￿cient is between the ￿rst income de￿nition on one side and the second and
third from the other. With the HRS approach, instead, the main di￿erence was between the ￿rst
and second on one side and the third on the other.
38Finally, if we look at the di￿erences between the de￿nitions of consumption that include durables
and those that do not, we ￿nd that the coe￿cients are (except for the ￿rst income de￿nition) larger
for the former than the latter. Again, this is consistent with the evidence from the HRS approach
which ￿nds less ‘excess smoothness’ when one includes durables in the de￿nition of consumption,
i.e., some self-insurance mechanisms seems to be at work via durables.
In addition to equation (38) we also estimated versions of equation (37) which include a time
trend and of (39) which involves the second di￿erences of the relevant variances. Remarkably, the
results we report in Table 3 are barely a￿ected.
The consistency of the results obtained with the variance approach and those obtained with the
HRS approach are remarkable because the two tests, as stressed above, focus on di￿erent aspects of
risk sharing: the latter on insurance across groups and the former on insurance between group. It
is remarkable that both yield results that are in line with our model and indicate that the observed
amount of risk sharing is in between that predicted by a simple Permanent Income model and that
predicted by perfect insurance markets. Comparing the magnitude of the coe￿cients obtained with
the two approaches, we can have a measure of the di￿erent degree of risk sharing possibilities that
are available within cohorts as opposed to those available across cohorts.
7 Conclusions
In in this paper, we discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of a model where perfect
risk sharing is not achieved because of information problems. A speci￿c (and certainly unique in
the empirical literature) feature of our model is the hidden access to the credit market. After
characterizing the equilibrium of this model, we have shown how it can be useful to interpret
individual data on consumption and income.
We have considered a combination of moral hazard and information problems on assets (and
therefore consumption). Developing results in Abraham and Pavoni (2004), we have shown that in
the constrained e￿cient equilibrium in our model agents obtain more insurance than in a Bewley
set up. Moreover, we are able to construct examples in which we can get closed form solutions
for consumption. These results have more than an aesthetic value: in our empirical approach they
allow us to give a structural interpretation to some of the empirical results in the literature and to
those we obtain. In particular, we show how our model can explain the so-called ‘excess smoothness’
of consumption and how tests of excess smoothness are distinct from the so-called excess sensitivity
tests.
The presence of excess smoothness follows from the fact that, even in the presence of moral
39hazard and hidden assets, in general, an e￿cient competitive equilibrium is able to provide some
insurance over and above what individuals achieve on their own by self insurance. The constrained
e￿cient allocations that prevail in the environment we consider di￿er from those one would obtain
in a Bewley model with no insurance, in that the agents are able to share some risk and are not
forced to rely only on self-insurance. This additional insurance is what generates excess smooth-
ness in consumption, which can then be interpreted as a violation of the intertemporal budget
constraint with a single asset. What such set of conditions is neglecting is the set of state con-
tingent Arrow-Debreu securities that the agent can purchase (possibly with some restrictions on
trades), in addition to the riskless asset, in a constrained e￿cient equilibrium. Or, if one prefers the
metaphor of the social planner, to get the standard PIH results, one should be considering income
net of transfers, rather than the standard concept used in the PIH literature. From an empirical
point of view, we show that in our framework, the so called ‘excess sensitivity’ tests (e￿ectively tests
of the martingale property implied by the intertemporal optimization problem solved by the con-
sumers) are distinct from the so called ‘excess smoothness’ tests, which, following Hansen, Roberds
and Sargent (1991), we frame as tests of an intertemporal budget constraint with a single asset.
When agents are able to obtain additional insurance relative to the Bewley economy, the IBC with
a single asset is violated because it neglects state contingent transfers. We show that in our model
we obtain ‘excess smoothness’ in the sense of Campbell and Deaton (1989), while we do not get
excess sensitivity. An important feature of our test, is that it is robust to di￿erent hypothesis about
the information structure available to economic agents, as long as the econometrician does not have
superior information.
While many papers, starting with Deaton and Campbell (1989) have documented the ‘excess
smoothness’ of consumption using aggregate time series data, the evidence based on micro data is
recent and limited. Nalewaik (2004) uses a simpli￿ed version of the HRS test (e￿ectively estimating
equation (29) which, for example, does not permit non-separabilities) and, based on the US CEX,
cannot reject the null of the PIH. This result contrasts both with what is obtained by Blundell et
al., 2004 in the PSID, and with what we ￿nd in this paper for the UK. Neither Nalewaik (2004),
nor Attanasio and Borella (2006), who (use a di￿erent identi￿cation strategy to) estimate a time
series model for micro consumption (and other variables) similar to the one we estimate, give their
results an interpretation in terms of risk sharing and test of asset markets.
In addition to the HRS test, we also propose a test based on the cross sectional variance of
consumption and income. While related to the work of Deaton and Paxson (1994), Blundell and
Preston (1994) and Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2004), our approach is di￿erent in that it
40focuses on the variance in the level rather than changes of consumption. Moreover, as is the case
of the version of the HRS test we present, we can give the coe￿cients we estimate a structural
interpretation in terms of our moral hazard model.
The approach followed by Blundell et al., (2004) is di￿erent from ours. It is more general
in some dimensions and less so in others. In particular, they exploit the panel dimension of the
PSID and are able to distinguish the e￿ects of consumption of permanent versus temporary income
shocks. In our data we cannot identify separately the two parameters. In any case, if one prefers
the assumptions made by Blundell et al. (2004) to those we make in deriving our test based on cross
sectional variances, we can still use our model to give a structural interpretation to the Blundell et
al. (2004) results.
Using our two di￿erent approaches we obtain results that are consistent with our model. We
forcefully reject both perfect risk sharing and the simple Bewley economy. Moreover, our rejections
are consistent with the model with moral hazard and hidden assets we considered. Particularly
suggestive is the evidence that when we consider income de￿nitions that include smoothing mech-
anisms, such as social assistance and net taxes, we ￿nd less evidence of ‘excess smoothness’.
Our results have obvious policy implications, as one could, in principle, be able to quantify in
terms of welfare the insurance role played by the taxation system or UI. Such computations would be
immediately feasible from our analysis. We would also be able to perform accurate counterfactuals
in order to evaluate the e￿ects of a given policy. All normative issues, however, are left for future
research.
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8 Appendix A: Implementing the e￿cient allocation with income taxes
In this section we show that under some conditions the optimal allocation (￿;c;x) can be ‘imple-
mented’ using a transfer scheme ￿ which is function of income histories xt alone. This will simplify
the analysis and allow us to describe the consumption allocation in terms of observables.
Notice ￿rst, that through xt = xt(￿t) the x component of the optimal allocation generates











general xt(￿t) is not invertible, as it might be the case that for a positive measure of histories
of shocks ￿t we get the same history of incomes xt. A generalization of the argument used in
Kocherlakota (2006) however shows that it su￿ces to assume that the optimal plan of consumption
c alone is xt-measurable.34 This is what we assume thereafter.
Now, notice that yt is xt-measurable by construction. As a consequence, from (15) is easy to
see that the xt-measurability of c implies that ￿ is xt-measurable as well. From the transfer scheme


































34That is, that there exists a sequence of x
t-measurable functions c
￿ such that for all t;￿










t): We will see below that under fairly general conditions the implementation idea of Kocherlakota (2006) extends

























for all t;￿t: For any history of shocks ￿t; a plan ^ ￿ not only entails di￿erent
e￿ort costs, it also generates a di￿erent distribution over income histories xt hence on transfers and
consumption. This justi￿es our notation for the conditional expectation.
We say that the optimal allocation (￿;c;x) can be implemented with xt￿measurable transfers
if the agent does not have incentive to deviate from c￿;￿￿ given ￿￿. The incentive constraint in











￿t￿1 u(^ ct; ^ et) n ^ ￿
#
; (44)
where, as usual, the deviation path of consumption ^ c must be replicated by a plan of risk free
bonds ^ b. An important restriction in the deviations ^ ￿ contemplated in constraint (44) is that they
are required to generate ‘attainable’ histories of x0s; i.e. histories of x0s that can happen in an
optimal allocation. The idea is that any o￿-the-equilibrium value for xt will detect a deviation with
certainty. One can hence set the planner’s transfers to a very low value (perhaps minus in￿nity) in
these cases, so that the agent will never have incentive to generate such o￿-the-equilibrium histories.
Finally, suppose the agent chooses an e￿ort plan ^ ￿ so that the realized history ^ xt is at-
tainable in equilibrium. This means both that there is a reporting strategy ^ ￿ so that ^ xt =
(x1 (^ ￿); x2 (^ ￿); :::; xt (^ ￿)) and that given a consumption plan ^ c the utility the agent gets is
E
hPT
t=1 ￿t￿1 u(^ ct;et) n (￿;c;x); ^ ￿
i
; where the notation is that in the main text.35 This e￿ec-
tively completes the proof since the incentive constraint (12) guarantees that the agent will chose
the truth-telling strategy which implies the equilibrium plans ￿ and c as optimal.














is ‘attainable’ it can be






















and from the de￿nition of ￿







































t￿1 u(ct;et) n (￿;c;x); ^ ￿
#
for some ^ ￿ 2 ￿: Finally, to see that constraint (13) guarantees incentive compatibility of c
￿ is straightforward.
A ￿nal remark. One can easily show that under the same conditions, ￿ must also be x
t-measurable. The intuition
is a follows. If ￿ is not x
t-measurable it means that for at least two some ￿
t; and ￿ ￿





















: However, since u is decreasing in e; e￿ort incentive compatibility (at bt = 0) implies
that ￿ s (￿




for some s ￿ t with ￿ not x
s-measurable. A contradiction to the fact that the optimal transfer
scheme ￿ is x
t￿measurable.
459 Appendix B: A Closed Form in Levels
The outcome of this section will be a structural interpretation, in terms of the marginal cost/return








where a ￿ 1 and 1
a is the marginal return to shirking. Since in our model wealth e￿ects are absent,
it will deliver a constant e￿ort level in any period, which will be normalized to zero. Zero e￿ort will
also be the ￿rst best level of e￿ort. So the whole margin in welfare will derive from risk sharing.
The incentive compatibility constraint will hence dictate the degree of such insurance as a function
of the marginal cost of e￿ort. A lower e￿ort cost/return will allow the planner to insure a lot
the agent without inducing him to shirk. And the planner will use the whole available margin to
impose transfers and obtain consumption smoothing.
For didactical reasons, we will now solve the model is steps, with increasing degree of compli-
cation.
9.1 The Model
Assume that u(c;e) = u(c ￿ e); and consider the following speci￿cation of the technology36
yt = f (￿t;et) = ￿t + aminfet;0g + bmaxfet;0g; with a ￿ 1 ￿ b; (45)
and e 2 (￿1;emax]: In other words, the production function has a kink at zero.37 Interestingly,
as we have seen in Section (4.1) for a = 1 we are in the standard ACK case (this is true even
when b < 1) hence there is no room for risk sharing at all (on top of self insurance) and the model
replicates the Bewley model.
Finally, notice that as long as a > 1 (and b < 1) the ￿rst best e￿ort level would be zero.
However, the ￿rst best allocation would also imply a constant consumption. This allocation can
only be obtained by imposing a constant tax rate such that ￿0
t = ￿1: Obviously, this allocation is
not incentive feasible in a world where e￿ort (and ￿) is private information of the agent.
36It will be clear soon that the linearity of f for e > 0 is not crucial for the closed form, as long as the slope of f
is uniformly bounded above by one in this region.
37None of the results change if we choose the kink at any other ￿ e > ￿1:
469.2 Static Conditions
We are looking for optimal transfer schemes among that class of continuously di￿erentiable transfer
schemes.
Consider ￿rst the static problem. When the production function is of the form (45), the incentive








￿1 if e￿ ￿ 0 and e￿ > ￿1;
with equalities if e 6= 0: As long as ￿0 ￿ 0 the relevant deviation would always be to reduce e￿ort,
i.e. only the second constraint is relevant. The great advantage of this formulation is that, since
production e￿ciency is not an issue,38 the planner will always use the whole margin to give risk
sharing to the agent. Hence the optimal tax rate is exactly ￿0 = 1
a ￿1: That is, ￿0 increases with a;
and it approaches ￿1 (the ￿rst best level) for a ! 1: Recall that the intuition is as follows: when
a is large the agent does not ￿nd very attractive to deviate from the optimal level e = 0 and this
reduces incentive costs, allowing more risk sharing. Clearly, a simple normalization z = ae induces






a is the marginal cost/return of e￿ort. When the marginal
cost/return of e￿ort is low the agent is easier to convince not to shirk.
Notice two important things that are very evident in this static case, but that will be veri￿ed
in the general case as well. First, since ￿0 = 1
a ￿1 must hold for all income levels, the tax schedule
must be linear in xt. Second, that since agent’s utility and the production function are concave,
when facing a linear tax schedule the agent problem is concave. Hence the incentive compatibility
can be substituted by the agent’s ￿rst order conditions. We conclude that a linear tax scheme is
optimal.
9.3 Two Periods
In order to get an idea about the working of the model in a dynamic framework, let’s now consider
the two period version of this model for the agent. They can obviously be seen as the last two
periods of a general T < 1 horizon model. If we normalize to zero the initial level of assets and
neglect the notation for previous history xT￿2; the agent objective function is
u(cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1) + ￿ET￿1u(cT ￿ eT)
38We will normalize e
￿ = 0: Notice that as long as as long as a > 1 > b; e
￿ = 0 is the unique e￿cient e￿ort level
under full information. With asymmetric information, incentive costs make e
￿ > 0 even less attractive. Moreover,
the linearity for e < 0 implies that a negaive e￿ort level cannot be optimal since it requires the same consumption
dispersion as e = 0 and it implies lower net welfare compared to e
￿ = 0.
47where for a given tax schedule ￿ we have
cT￿1 =yT￿1 + ￿T￿1 (xT￿1) ￿ qbT;
cT =yT + ￿T (xT￿1;xT) + bT;
and, as before,
yt = ￿t + aminfet;0g + maxfet;0g.




u0 (cT ￿ eT)
u0 (cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1)
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u0 (cT ￿ eT)













We will see more in detail below that since
@￿T(xT￿1;xT)
@xT does not depend on xT￿1; whenever the
scheme is di￿erentiable, we have that
@￿T(xT￿1;xT)
@xT￿1 is constant in xT: Using the Euler equation, the









￿ 1; for all xT￿1;xT:
This implies that the discounted sum of the last two taxes is a linear function of xT￿1, whose slope
does not depend on xT: We hence get



















And, similarly for ￿(￿T￿1 + q￿T); we get






(xT￿1 + qxT ￿ ET￿2 [xT￿1 + qxT]):
This expression does not depend on the process on ￿t; and it provides a very simple (linear)
relationship between the innovation on the expected discounted value of taxes and the innovation
in the permanent income.
489.4 Generic Time Horizon
We are now ready to derive the results for a generic ￿nite horizon model. The analogous to (46),
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u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)






In order to complete the derivation, we ￿rst show the following result.




@xs does not depend on (xt;:::;xT) for all s: They are hence linear
functions of xs given xt:
The proof is by induction. Recall the discussion made for the static case, and notice that the




a ￿1 for all xT￿1 and xT: This implies that the cross derivative
@￿T(xT￿1;xT)
@xT@xt = 0: Since ￿T is continuously di￿erentiable, it must be that
@￿T(xT)
@xt is constant in xT
for all t < T as claimed above.39
Now consider ￿T￿1. Since
@￿T(xT)
@xT￿1 does not depend on xT; the e￿ort incentive compatibility can
































@xT￿1 is a constant for all all xT￿2 and





@xt is also constant in xT￿1 (and xT) for all t:40 Going backwards, we have our result:
PT
n=t qn￿t @￿n(xn)
@xs is constant in xt;:::xT for all s: Q.E.D.
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xT with h di￿erentiable.
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u0 (cT ￿ eT)
u0 (cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1)
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A u0 (cT￿1 ￿ eT￿1)












u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n)
















A u0 (cT￿2 ￿ eT￿2)


































Note that the above expression for taxes holds true for every concave u and all values for ￿;q < 1:
We have hence shown the following:
Proposition 2 Assume ￿ is an optimal transfer scheme among all di￿erentiable contracts for
u(c;e) = u(c ￿ e); with u increasing concave and di￿erentiable, and f as in (45). Then ￿ solves
(47) or all t < T < 1:
The above proposition simply says that (47) is a necessary condition of optimality. Indeed, it is
derived by only using a relaxed version of the incentive compatibility constraint. One line of attach
is to show conditions under which this scheme is unique. We follow a di￿erent approach. We will
show the agent’s problem is globally concave when facing the optimal tax scheme. Intuitively, since
taxes are linear taxes, as long as they are non-negative in the decision variables of the agent the
result is obtained by the concavity of the utility and the production functions. The formal proof
however forces us to restrict the analysis to the case where ￿ ￿ q and to specify the preferences
of the agent to be quadratic. The speci￿cation of preferences will allow us to derive an analytical
speci￿cation for taxes and to link linearly consumption to income.
50Since ￿ is bounded above, in any ￿nite horizon problem we can choose a quadratic utility
speci￿cation such that the bliss point is never reached. We will assume
u(c ￿ e) = ￿
1
2
￿ ￿ B ￿ (c ￿ e)
￿2 with ￿ B >> T￿max: (48)
Lemma 2. If the agent has quadratic preferences and ￿ ￿ q; within the class of di￿erentiable
schemes, taxes are in fact linear with
@￿t(xt)




0 for all t: If ￿ = q then
@￿t(xt)
@xt￿s = 0 and 1 +
@￿t(xt)
@xt = 1
a; this for all t ￿ 0 and s > 0:
When the agent has quadratic preferences, the Euler equation in each period together with the
law of iterated expectations imply41




















￿ B for all t;s ￿ 0: (49)




















We will work backwards.
As seen above, the (constant) slope of ￿T in xT is given by the e￿ort incentive constraint (50)













@xT￿1 and show that it is nonnegative.
Consider the Euler equation between periods T ￿ 1 and T: Using the linearity of ￿T in xT;
equation (49) for t = T ￿ 1 and s = 1 speci￿es to



























the linearity of ￿T in xT.



















41Recall that we implement bt ￿ 0 - i.e. ct = yt + ￿t - and et ￿ 0:

















we are able to eliminate 1 +
@￿T￿1(xT￿1)
















RT ￿ 0: (55)
The last inequality - which implies
@￿T(xT)
@xT￿1 ￿ 0 - is true since RT = 1
a and we assumed ￿ ￿ q:
Next, we obtain the expression for the contemporaneous tax 1 +
@￿T￿1(xT￿1)




























:= RT￿1 ￿ 0: (56)
We are now almost ready to start the recursion.






@xT￿2 : Those are obtained in ￿ve steps.








































































Fourth, rearranging the last two conditions in order to eliminate 1 +
@￿T￿2(xT￿2)

















RT￿1 ￿ 0; (60)
52where the inequality is true since recalling that RT = 1













and the inequality is implied by the assumption ￿ ￿ q:













































Again, the last inequality is implied by the fact that as long as ￿ ￿ q we have both that RT￿1 ￿ 1
a
and ￿ + q2 ￿ q + q2 q
￿. Of course, once
@￿T￿1(xT￿1)
@xT￿2 is obtained, it is immediate to derive
@￿T(xT)
@xT￿2
from (57), which is nonnegative if and only if
@￿T￿1(xT￿1)
@xT￿2 ￿ 0.
The derivation for all other marginal taxes is tedious but straightforward. Once the expression
for the contemporaneous taxes 1 +
@￿t+1(xt+1)
@xt+1 := Rt+1 ￿ 0 is obtained, one can follow the same
steps we have describe above to obtain all marginal taxes with respect to xt. Namely: First, one













for all s ￿ 0:





































to obtain (fourth) the expression for, say,
@￿t+1(xt+1)
@xt : Which on one hand will then be used to
obtain Rt: On the other hand it will deliver
@￿t+s(xt+s)
@xt from the ￿rst step. And so on till period
t = 1: By direct inspection, it is not di￿cult to realize that they will all satisfy the conditions
stated in the proposition.
The speci￿cation of our formulae for ￿ = q imply that Rt = 1
a and, as a consequence,
@￿T￿s(xT￿s)
@xt = 0 for all t and s: Q.E.D.
53We now use that fact that the tax scheme is linear to show the following Lemma that concludes
the proof.
Lemma 3. If the agent has quadratic preferences, and ￿ ￿ q when facing the above tax, the
agent’s problem is concave, so the so derived tax scheme is optimal.
We have to show that, when facing the optimal tax scheme, the agent’s problem is jointly
concave in fet (xt)g
T
t=0 and fbt+1 (xt)g
T
t=0 : Consider two contingent plans e1;b1;c1 and e2;b2;c2:













; and similarly for bt and ct: First of all, since both e￿ort and assets enter linearly in
the utility function, the concavity of the agent’s utility and the additive separability over time and
states imply that if we show that c￿ is attainable we are done.
We will show the statement for ￿ = q but the proof is similar for the general case with ￿ ￿ q.
Of course, what is crucial for the proof is what we have shown above. Namely, that marginal taxes
are all nonnegative but the contemporaneous ones
@￿t(xt)
@xt ; which are such that 1 +
@￿t(xt)
@xt ￿ 0.
Recall that when ￿ = q
@￿t(xt)





a ￿ 1 for all t. The ￿nal part of the
proof is hence very simple. If the agent chooses plan e￿ of e￿ort, period t net income available for
consumption is given by
x￿









































t + (1 ￿ ￿)x2
t
i
+ kt = c￿
t ;
where the inequality in the penultimate row comes from the concavity of f in e and a ￿ 1 > 0: The
last line is de￿nitional. Q.E.D.
When ￿ = q and u is quadratic, the derivation of the optimal scheme is particularly simple.















xt = kt +
1
a
xt for all t ￿ 0:
This, together with the Euler equation implies kt+1 = kt and
￿ct+1 = ct+1 ￿ ct =
1
a






54The obvious generalization of the previous expression is valid for ￿ < q as well. The reader
should not be surprised to realize that when the agent is facing only permanent shocks expression
(61) for q = ￿ holds true independently from the horizon the agent faces.
In￿nite Horizon Since for T su￿ciently large any bond ￿ B will be eventually reached for some
history of income shocks, we cannot address the in￿nite horizon cases properly. On the other hand
we can interpret the in￿nite horizon case as the ‘limit case’ for T very large, but ￿nite. According





















One can obtain the closed form for the single taxes as well. They will be time-invariant and all
corresponding to the limiting expression one can derive for R1 above as T goes to in￿nity. Details
are available upon request. Of course, for ￿ = q also in this limit case we have
@￿t(xt)
@xt￿s ￿ 0; and
@￿t(xt)
@xt ￿ 1











izations as well. Denote by ht =
￿
xt;￿t￿
the combined public history. If we specify a production







t + aT minflt;0g + bT maxflt;0g with aT > 1 > bT;
and the following agent’s preferences over ct; lt and et : u(ct ￿ lt ￿ et):










u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n ￿ lt+n)















u0 (ct+n ￿ et+n ￿ lt+n)





where, for consistency, we denoted by ap the slope of f for et ￿ 0: By the same reasons we gave
in the proof of Lemma 1, as long as we restrict ourself to di￿erentiable schemes, one can uses the






















55Assuming quadratic preferences, for permanent shocks, the Euler equation implies the same taxes


















￿ 0 for all k;s > 0:


















; for all k;s > 0:
Then, one uses the incentive constraint and follows the same ￿ve-steps line of derivation we ex-





@￿t and show that all are nonnegative. Details are available upon request.
Give our empirical target, we report here below the (analytically simpler) expressions for the
‘in￿nite-horizon’ speci￿cation of our model. For permanent shocks, we obviously obtain exactly















= 1 + ￿
(t)
￿ ￿ 0: (63)
As explained in the proof for Lemma 2, all the above expressions imply optimality when ￿ ￿ q:
According to (63) when ￿ < q marginal taxes with respect to temporary shocks explode as k
increases. The expressions for taxes are then obtained as solutions to di￿erence equations.
It is easy to see by direct inspection of (63) and from the previous analysis that for ￿ = q the
in￿nite horizon case delivers the following expressions for taxes:
1 + ￿x =
1
ap and 1 + ￿￿ =
1 ￿ q
aT ;
where 1 + ￿x = 1 +
@￿t(ht)




@￿t for k > 0: Hence tax rates are













10 Appendix C: Isoelastic Utility: A Closed Form in Logs
We will only consider the in￿nite horizon case, and start from the case with only permanent shocks.
The outcome of this section will be an expression for innovation in log consumption of the form































t+1 is the innovation to (log) permanent income and 1
￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption and C is consumption.42
42In this section, we change a bit notation hoping that it will be all clear since we de￿ne any new variable.
56The Isoelastic Model Let yt = lnYt; and e := lnN: We assume the log income process follows:
yt = xt + ￿t
where
xt = f(￿t;et) = ￿t + ap minf0;eg + bp maxf0;eg; with ap ￿ 1 > bp:
This is precisely the same formulation as above, but with all variables interpreted in logs. Similarly,
we specify ￿t = vT
t +aT minflt;0g+bT maxflt;0g: Again, for notational simplicity, we will disregard
￿t: We hence denote ap simply with a:
Notice that the production function corresponds to a modi￿cation of the standard Cobb-
Douglas: Xt = ￿tNa
t ; and Xt = ￿tNb
t for Nt ￿ 1 and Nt ￿ 1 respectively.
We specify the following process for skills:
ln￿t ￿ ￿t = ￿t￿1 + v
p
t:
An additional assumption, which will be crucial for us to get an exact closed form, is that the
shocks v
p
t are normally distributed with mean ￿vp and variance ￿2
vp.










for ￿ > 1; and E0
X
t=0
￿t (lnCt ￿ lnNt) for ￿ = 1:









expf(1 ￿ ￿)(ct ￿ et)g
where ct := lnCt:
It will be convenient to write the problem in logs so that we can use the analogies to the case
in levels. The budget constraint can be written as follows:







Since in equilibrium we will have N￿

























where we used the fact that Ct+1 is log normally distributed, with ￿ct+1 having conditional mean
￿t and conditional variance ￿2
t.
57Since we will implement b￿
t ￿ 0; ct
￿
xt￿
= xt + ￿t
￿
xt￿

















Given our speci￿cation for f; the objective function can be all expressed in logs. It is now easy to

















One can again show that conditional expectations can be decomposed since
@￿t+n(xt+n)
@xt does not

























>From the Euler equation we obtain:
exp
￿
































































Using the properties of the normality, and assuming that log consumption innovation conditional
variance and conditional mean are constant and equal to ￿ and ￿2 respectively (a property which














































43It can be deduced from (65) the intuitive fact that when utility is logarithmic, we have d =
￿
























































































Now the analogy to the quadratic case is transparent. One can indeed show that the analysis
for temporary shocks is again a combination of that just performed and that we have done when
we studied the case with temporary shocks in the quadratic case. We hence obtain the expression
reported at the beginning of this section.
Why consumption is log normally distributed? By following a similar derivation to that
for the quadratic case, from the Euler equation, we have










Going backward we obtain that ￿t+1 only depends on xt+1; and it is actually linear in xt+1 (with
constant slope), hence consumption is log normally distributed. Start by the Euler equation for














































where we used the fact that in equilibrium EtxT = xT￿1: And so on till period 1:







gross earnings gross earnings gross earnings + gross earnings + net earnings + net earnings +
 benefits  benefits benefits benefits
income equation
w2 11 11 1 1
ayc(t) - - - - - -
0.505 - 0.333 - 0.376 -
ayc(t-1) (20.735) - (25.683) - (18.240) -
-0.672 - -0.748 - -0.507 -
ayc(t-2) (12.252) - (18.183) - (10.247) -
w1
ayy(t) 1.159 1.171 1.073 1.064 0.771 0.793
(0.346) (0.317) (0.329) (0.317) (0.253) (0.243)
ayy(t-1) -1.140 -1.148 -0.887 -0.894 -0.602 -0.587
(0.454) (0.415) (0.492) (0.459) (0.342) (0.323)
ayy(t-2) 0.992 0.995 0.827 0.844 0.619 0.568
(0.370) (0.331) (0.356) (0.311) (0.257) (0.227)
consumption equation
w1
acc(t) 1 1 1 1 1 1
-- -- - -
acc(t-1) -0.577 -0.493 -0.604 -0.491 -0.612 -0.499
(0.196) (0.114) (0.193) (0.116) (0.191) (0.111)
acc(t-2) 0.084 - 0.116 - 0.118 -
(0.201) - (0.191) - (0.193) -
Log L -773.3 -773.9 -759.5 -760.6 -685.0 -685.5
excess smoothness -0.491 -0.499 -0.489 -0.493 -0.273 -0.263
se (0.171) (0.165) (0.160) (0.153) (0.132) (0.128)
Comparison with 4 lags model
Log L 4lags model -771.5 -773.6 -756.3 -760.4 -681.7 -685.3
LR 3.7 0.54 6.34 0.42 6.52 0.34
P-value 0.717 0.763 0.386 0.811 0.368 0.844
NOTES: 
- all data are in (first diff of) levels
- SE in parentheses
- excess smoothness test computed as sum(acc(t-L))-sum(ayy(t-L))=0, with L=0,…,4
- interest rate =0.01
- Income/consumption shock is the shock that enters both the income and the consumption equation
- LR test is the test of current model against previous (to the left) one. In green if restrictions Table 2
Total Consumption Expenditure
gross earnings gross earnings gross earnings + gross earnings + net earnings + net earnings +
benefits benefits benefits benefits
income equation
w2 11 1 1 1 1
ayc(t) - - - - - -
51.615 - 0.400 - 0.321 -
ayc(t-1) (1535.290) - (9.124) - (28.027) -
-36.884 - -0.968 - -0.765 -
ayc(t-2) (1072.450) - (7.222) - (20.287) -
w1
ayy(t) 0.596 0.586 0.730 0.497 0.683 0.662
(0.427) (0.351) (0.383) (0.346) (0.236) (0.205)
ayy(t-1) -0.341 -0.673 -0.472 -0.533 -0.277 -0.273
(0.638) (0.473) (0.572) (0.477) (0.358) (0.304)
ayy(t-2) 0.572 0.981 0.561 0.910 0.330 0.363
(0.451) (0.467) (0.430) (0.451) (0.280) (0.238)
consumption equation
w1
acc(t) 1 1 1 1 1 1
-- - - - -
acc(t-1) -0.349 -0.346 -0.386 -0.345 -0.372 -0.395
(0.406) (0.208) (0.366) (0.202) (0.367) (0.172)
acc(t-2) -0.069 - -0.022 - -0.031 -
(0.358) - (0.330) - (0.319) -
Log L -885.2 -886.0 -869.4 -870.5 -788.0 -788.9
excess smoothness -0.233 -0.224 -0.217 -0.203 -0.131 -0.174
se (0.128) (0.144) (0.116) (0.113) (0.099) (0.128)
Comparison with 4 lags model
Log L 4lags model -882.3 -885.4 -867.8 -869.6 -786.2 -788.3
LR 5.78 1.24 3.26 1.82 3.54 1.1
P-value 0.448 0.538 0.776 0.403 0.739 0.577
NOTES: 
all data are in (first diff of) levels
SE in parentheses
excess smoothness test computed as sum(axx(t-L))-sum(ayx(t-L))=0, with L=0,…,4
interest rate =0.01Table 3
Total Consumption Expenditure: log specification
gross earnings gross earnings gross earnings + gross earnings + net earnings + net earnings +





ayy(t-1) 0.332 - 0.181 - 0.159 -
(14.452) - (4.936) - (1.982) -
ayy(t-2) -0.748 - -0.779 - -0.595 -
(10.305) - (3.957) - (1.426) -
Income/Consumption Shock
ayx(t) 0.889 0.816 0.717 0.748 0.799 0.570
(0.200) (0.155) (0.162) (0.146) (0.191) (0.187)
ayx(t-1) -1.102 -1.250 -0.685 -0.836 -0.523 -0.222
(0.249) (0.206) (0.216) (0.177) (0.253) (0.211)
ayx(t-2) 0.393 0.660 0.094 0.223 -0.120 0.086





axx(t-1) -0.601 -1.011 -0.647 -1.011 -0.578 -0.619
(0.243) (0.008) (0.279) (0.008) (0.324) (0.125)
axx(t-2) -0.411 - -0.368 - -0.444 -
(0.247) - (0.282) - (0.330) -
Log L 100.9 97.2 153.3 148.6 173.8 168.2
LR 7.4 9.38 11.16
P-Value 0.007 0.002 0.001
excess smoothness -0.181 -0.226 -0.133 -0.141 -0.170 -0.048
se (0.100) (0.079) (0.050) (0.053) (0.066) (0.106)
NOTES: 
all data are in (first diff of) levels
SE in parentheses
excess smoothness test computed as sum(axx(t-L))-sum(ayx(t-L))=0, with L=0,…,4
interest rate =0.01Table 4
Variance Based Test
non durable consumption non durable consumption total consunmption total consumption 
 per ad.eq.   per ad.eq. 
Ind. Var.
Gross earnings  0.0709 0.0376 0.0765 0.0547
0.0133 0.0154 0.0177 0.0196
implied a 3.7556 5.1571 3.6144 4.2746
0.0484 0.0900 0.0610 0.0865
Gross earnings+ 0.2357 0.1476 0.3019 0.2495
benefits 0.0302 0.0355 0.0401 0.0448
implied a 2.0596 2.6032 1.8200 2.0021
0.0447 0.0747 0.0492 0.0634
Net earnings + 0.2601 0.1466 0.3478 0.2733
benefits 0.0351 0.0413 0.0463 0.0519
implied a 1.9608 2.6121 1.6957 1.9129
0.0482 0.0871 0.0511 0.0686
Number of observ 505 505 505 505